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Abstract
A public decision-making problem consists of a set of issues, each with multiple possible
alternatives, and a set of competing agents, each with a preferred alternative for each issue. We
study adaptations of market economies to this setting, focusing on binary issues. Issues have
prices, and each agent is endowed with artificial currency that she can use to purchase probability
for her preferred alternatives (we allow randomized outcomes). We first show that when each
issue has a single price that is common to all agents, market equilibria can be arbitrarily bad.
This negative result motivates a different approach. We present a novel technique called
pairwise issue expansion, which transforms any public decision-making instance into an equiva-
lent Fisher market, the simplest type of private goods market. This is done by expanding each
issue into many goods: one for each pair of agents who disagree on that issue. We show that the
equilibrium prices in the constructed Fisher market yield a pairwise pricing equilibrium in the
original public decision-making problem which maximizes Nash welfare. More broadly, pairwise
issue expansion uncovers a powerful connection between the public decision-making and private
goods settings; this immediately yields several interesting results about public decisions mar-
kets, and furthers the hope that we will be able to find a simple iterative voting protocol that
leads to near-optimum decisions.
1 Introduction
Fair and transparent public decision-making is a key element of a democratic society, but many
public decisions are made by government officials behind closed doors. In this paper, we investigate
mechanisms for large-scale public decision-making where citizens directly vote on a set of issues at
the same time, focusing on the case where each issue has exactly two alternatives. In particular, we
examine connections to private goods allocation (i.e., standard resource allocation). One can think
of each issue that is under consideration as a “good”, and public decision-making as “allocating” the
good to one of the alternatives. We allow randomized outcomes, where the outcome can put nonzero
probability on multiple alternatives: this is analogous to divisible private goods, where a good can
be split among multiple agents1. The fundamental difference is that in private goods allocation,
each agent’s utility depends only on the bundle of goods she receives; in public decision-making,
the group makes a single decision that affects all agents.
Market economies are one of the longest-studied areas in the distributions of private goods. The
simplest market model is that of a Fisher market (see [7] for a modern exposition), which consists
of a set of available goods and a set of agents with money they wish to spend. It is typically
assumed that the agents have no value for the money itself, and wish to spend their entire budget
1An alternative interpretation is that the issues themselves are divisible: for example, in the case of a city choosing
how much money to a particular project, any amount of money is a valid outcome.
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to acquire goods that they desire. Each good has a price which determines how much money an
agent must spend to purchase one unit of the good. The goods are divisible, meaning that an agent
can purchase any fraction of a good. A market equilibrium assigns a price to each good such that
every agent purchases their favorite bundle that is affordable under the prices, and that the demand
meets the supply. Under some mild conditions (elaborated on in Section 2), a market equilibrium
always exists [3].
1.1 Our contribution
We consider adaptations of markets to the public decision-making setting. Many democracy the-
orists believe that it is unethical (eg. see [46]) and many democratic countries stipulate that it
is illegal to allow citizens to purchase political influence with actual money. Instead, we think of
each agent being endowed with the same amount of “artificial currency” that is useful only for
voting on these issues; thus our approach to public decision markets is consistent with the spirit of
“one person one vote”. Prices are assigned to issues, and agents can use their artificial currency to
“purchase” probability for their preferred alternatives on the issues they most value2.
Markets have the desirable property that each agent can choose how to allocate her money
across goods, based on their relative values to her. In the context of large-scale public decision-
making, this allows agents to express their relative weights for the different issues in a fine-grained
way. This is in contrast to approaches like asking agents to rank the issues by importance, which
are more limited in expressiveness. Markets have the additional property that the equilibria are
“supported” by prices: prices provide a sort of certificate of fairness, in that each agent can verify
that she is spending her budget in the best way possible.
The simplest pricing model assigns a single price to each issue, and all agents are subject to the
same set of prices. We refer to this as “per-issue pricing”, or just “issue pricing”. In the private
goods setting, per-good pricing is sufficient to yield a market equilibrium with optimal Nash welfare:
the product of agent utilities3. Unfortunately, we show in Section 3 that issue pricing in the public
decisions setting can result in very poor equilibria: the Nash welfare of the equilibrium may be
a factor of O(n) worse than optimal, where n is the number of agents. The same instance shows
that the utilitarian welfare (the sum of agent utilities) and egalitarian welfare (the minimum agent
utility) may both be a factor of O(n) worse than optimal as well.
1.1.1 Pairwise issue expansion.
This negative result motivates a more complex market model. Our main contribution is a reduction
which transforms any public decision-making instance into a private goods Fisher market instance
that is “equivalent” in a strong sense. For each issue, we construct a good for each pair of agents
who disagree on that issue. The outcome on that issue can be thought of as the result of pairwise
negotiations between each pair of agents who disagree. We refer to this reduction as pairwise
issue expansion. The equilibrium prices of the constructed Fisher market yield a “pairwise pricing
equilibrium” in the original public decisions instance. We show that the resulting pairwise pricing
equilibrium maximizes Nash welfare in the public decisions instance.
Furthermore, pairwise issue expansion allows us to directly import results for Fisher markets
to the public decisions setting. If the utilities in the public decisions instance are in class H (say,
linear utilities), the utilities in the constructed Fisher market will be nestedH-Leontief (for example,
2This can also be thought of as a private goods market with externalities: each agent’s utility depends not only
on her own bundle, but also other agents’ bundles.
3The concept of Nash welfare is due to [42] and [37].
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nested linear-Leontief)4. This means that any result which works for Fisher markets with nested
H-Leontief utilities can be imported to public decisions instances with utilities in class H. The main
Fisher market results we consider are: (1) a strongly polynomial-time algorithm for finding a Fisher
market equilibrium with two agents and any utility functions [10], (2) a strongly polynomial-time
algorithm for finding a Fisher market equilibrium for Leontief utilities with weights in {0, 1} [24],
(3) a polynomial-time algorithm for a Fisher market with Leontief utilities which yields a O(log n)
approximation simultaneously for all canonical welfare functions (i.e. Nash welfare, utilitarian
welfare, egalitarian welfare, etc) [30], and (4) a discrete-time taˆtonnement process for finding the
Fisher market equilibrium for nested CES-Leontief utilities that converges in polynomial-time [4].
Thus pairwise issue expansion yields the following results for the public decision-making setting:
1. A strongly polynomial-time algorithm for finding a public decisions market equilibrium with
two agents and any utility functions.
2. A strongly polynomial-time algorithm for finding a public decisions market equilibrium for
Leontief utilities with weights in {0, 1}.
3. A polynomial-time algorithm for a public decisions instance with Leontief utilities which
yields a O(log n) approximation simultaneously for all canonical welfare functions (i.e. Nash
welfare, utilitarian welfare, egalitarian welfare, etc).
4. A discrete-time taˆtonnement process for finding a public decisions market equilibrium for
CES utilities that converges in polynomial-time.
These Fisher market results yield the analogous results for public decisions instances for two
agents with any utilities, Leontief utilities with weights in {0, 1}5, any Leontief utilities, and CES
utilities, respectively. We also discuss public decisions taˆtonnement in more depth, and show how
our reduction can be used to implement a taˆtonnement process where agents only interact with the
public decisions instance, and never see the constructed Fisher market.
More broadly, our work uncovers a powerful connection between private goods allocation and
public decision-making. We hope that pairwise issue expansion will have applications in future
work as well. One particularly promising direction is to design an iterative local voting scheme
akin to prediction markets (see [12]), where agents (or pairs of agents) arrive sequentially and move
the current decision vector in their preferred direction subject to offered issue prices. Our proof of
the existence of a simple taˆtonnement for public decision markets offers hope that such a scheme
may be possible.
1.2 Related work
Equilibrium theory has a long history in economics [3, 7, 50, 54]. More recently, this topic has
garnered significant interest in the computer science community as well (see [51] for an algorithmic
introduction).
4These utility classes will be defined and discussed later.
5A nested Leontief-Leontief function is still a Leontief function. Incidentally, this also implies that for a public
decision making problem where agent utilities are Leontief, we get a Fisher market which has exactly the same form,
i.e. with Leontief utilities.
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Foley’s work on Lindahl Equilibria The market concept most directly relevant to our public
decision markets is that of Lindahl equilibria, developed by Foley [22], who showed that personalized
prices (i.e., each agent may be assigned a different price for each good with no restrictions) can
support any Pareto optimal solution in the context of public goods6. Our work can be thought
of as improving upon Foley’s work to get much stronger properties for the special case of public
decision-making. We obtain these stronger properties using a more sophisticated reduction, one
which is in fact weaker in the sense that there is a correspondence between the public decisions
market and the private market only at equilibrium. Our reduction explicitly relies on the fact that
agents are in opposition on each issue in the public decisions setting, which is not the case in the
public goods setting.
The stronger properties we obtain are as follows. First, Foley’s work [22] allows arbitrary
personalized prices, whereas we only require pairwise prices: for each issue, there is a price for each
pair of agents who disagree on that issue. Our Fisher market can be thought of as negotiating
independently with each person that disagrees with you through a normal market; we are not
aware of any such simple interpretation that follows from Foley’s very general work. Second, in
our private goods reduction, a feasible public goods decision (where each agent shares the same
societal decision) emerges naturally: we leverage properties of nested-Leontief utilities and the
Nash welfare objective function to implicitly represent the feasibility constraints, which allows us
to obtain the correspondence only at equilibrium. In contrast, Foley adds cone constraints to a
private goods market to explicitly enforce the feasibility constraints of the public decision-making
problem; these constraints have no natural real-world analogue. Third, we reduce the public goods
setting to a Fisher market, arguably the simplest possible and most-studied private goods market.
Because of this, our reduction allows us to lift many Fisher market equilibrium results to the public
decision-making setting. In particular, our reduction allows us to obtain a taˆtonnement for public
decision-making, even though intermediate steps in the taˆtonnement are in a regime where the
public and private markets are not in direct correspondence. It is unclear whether this is possible
with Foley’s construction. We discuss this in technical detail and elaborate on how our work relates
to Lindahl equilibria in Appendix A.
Taˆtonnement As mentioned above, one of our results is a taˆtonnement for public decision-
making. A taˆtonnement is an iterative process which presents agents with a set of prices, asks
what they would buy given those prices, and updates the price of each good based on the aggregate
demand of each good. A taˆtonnement-like process for computing the maximum Nash welfare
outcome in participatory budgeting (see e.g. [29] for more on PB) was recently given by Fain et
al. [21]. They showed that the maximum Nash welfare outcome can be computed by using a
stochastic gradient descent style algorithm. Their algorithm iteratively elicits agents’ demands
using a process very similar to quadratic voting [40] and updates the current solution accordingly.
While this is similar to a taˆtonnement, there is one crucial difference. A true taˆtonnement (such as
the one we present) allows the agents to directly change the current point: the price of each good
is updated by a fixed rule based on the aggregate demand of that good. In contrast, the algorithm
of [21] moves to a point that is different from the one elicited by the quadratic voting. Also, their
result also holds only for linear utilities7.
A taˆtonnement, with a similar elicitation scheme, has been shown to work in practice in the
6In public goods, all agents have nonnegative utility for every good, and the question is how to allocate their
money between the goods. In contrast, in public decision-making, agents have opposing preferred alternatives and
are in direct competition on each issue. With a careful modification, Foley’s work does carry over to the public
decision-making setting.
7This discussion is thanks to Kamesh Munagala via private correspondence.
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participatory budgeting setting [25, 26]. In those works, a new budget is directly elicited from
voters, and the mechanism works for ℓp normed cost functions. However, their mechanism finds a
total welfare maximizing point as opposed to a Nash welfare maximizing outcome. One direction
for future work is to adapt the taˆtonnement from this work into such an implementable mechanism
with a large number of voters.
Inefficiencies of pricing schemes Another relevant paper from the economics literature is [15],
which shows that per-good pricing can lead to inefficiency for public goods. Their examples do not
provide bounds on how much worse per-good pricing can be: in contrast, we show that for linear
utilities, issue pricing can be a factor of O(n) worse than optimal. Also, we note that it is easy to
adapt the examples in Section 3 to show that two other popular market-based approaches, namely
Quadratic Voting [40] and Trading Post Prices [1], also do not result in good equilibria with issue
pricing in our public decision market setting.
Strategic agents A key property in mechanism design is strategy-proofness (or lack thereof). A
mechanism is strategy-proof if even a selfish agent would always honestly report her preferences.
Most relevant to us is [47], which shows that even for two agents with linear utilities over divisible
goods, any mechanism which is both strategy-proof and Pareto optimal8 is dictatorial, meaning
that one agent receives all of the resources9. Our binary-issue public decisions setting generalizes
the two agent private goods setting, and hence we immediately inherit this impossibility result: any
mechanism which is both strategy-proof and Pareto optimal is dictatorial. A dictatorial solution
is clearly not desirable, and we would like our outcomes to be Pareto optimal, so we assume
throughout this paper that agents honestly report their preferences and do not address the issue
of strategic behavior. Other incentive compatibility results for implementation of general classes of
social choice functions are discussed in [16].
We note that several works extending Foley relax the assumption that agents report their
preferences truthfully, by building voting games in which the equilibrium is one in which truthful
reporting is incentive compatible for each agent [31, 53, 36]. Most notably, Groves and Ledyard [31]
construct an allocation-taxation scheme – using message passing – for a market with both private
goods and public commodities, such that the equilibrium behavior results in a Pareto optimal
solution. As in our work, however, their mechanism is still susceptible to a manipulation in which
a consumer considers how future prices and the behavior of others are affected by her current
decisions.
Other voting schemes, and one person one vote Other works also propose alternate voting
schemes for multiple issues. Storable Votes [9] allows members of a committee to store votes for
future meetings so as to spend their votes on issues that matter most to them; the work proves
welfare gains in the case of two voters but does not give a principled way to balance the relative
importance or cost of different issues, as we do here. In [14], the authors study adaptations of
private goods fairness notions (such as proportionality) to the public decision-making context when
randomized outcomes are not allowed. In contrast, we allow fractional solutions (i.e. randomized
outcomes) and exactly maximize Nash welfare.
Such works, especially this one, may seem to violate the principle of One Person One Vote [23,
33, 8, 2, 27, 38]. In particular, as we propose individual prices, a given issue may “cost” more for
8An outcome is Pareto optimal if there is no way to improve the utility of any agent without hurting another
agent.
9A similar result holds for indivisible goods [39].
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one voter than for another. However, as discussed below, these prices are generated in a principled
manner – for each issue, there is a single price for each pair of voters who disagree on the issue.
Furthermore, we note that, at the onset, each voter is allocated the same “budget” through which
to vote on issues.
Other works in market equilibria for public goods Finally, we note that many more strands
of literature, too many to detail here, discuss and extend the work of Foley [22] and more generally
the idea of equilibria for the funding of public goods. This work includes both stronger results in
a more specific model, as this work, and computational hardness analysis of equilibria theory in
general [44, 52]. To our knowledge, our public decision-making setting has not been studied as a
special case of such public goods markets.
In [6] and [5], the authors ask what happens when the decision to fund a single public good
is simply made through a majority vote; in particular, they study under what conditions of voter
preferences for the public good and distribution of tax shares of each voter is the funding of the good
Pareto optimal. They find that majority vote can fall short of optimal if income is asymmetrically
distributed. In Section 3, we show that the case with multiple public decisions is far worse: a
generalization of majority vote – where each issue has a price – leads to highly suboptimal outcomes,
even when everyone is endowed with the same income.
Another strand aims to study the implications of relationships between individuals. For exam-
ple, in [43], agents are allowed to form coalitions through binding contracts, resulting in inefficien-
cies. In [20], there are people who can “produce” a given public good and those who “benefit” from
that good. These relationships can be represented by a network in a certain way, and the Lindahl
outcomes correspond to a solution characterized by the eigenvector centralities of each node. In
this work, voters who agree on a given issue end up on the same side of a bipartite graph, resulting
in them purchasing the same probability for that issue.
The assumptions and philosophical underpinnings of equilibria theory are also well-studied, as
are applications to other fields. Sen [48] challenges the notion that people have consistent prefer-
ences that can be elicited. In particular, he posits that people have “commitments” to a particular
social group of other people, whose welfare they care about. We note that the assumption of a util-
ity function is nevertheless common, though it is important to be aware of the limitations of such
behavioral abstractions. In [45], competitive equilibria is connected to the idea that in capitalism
people are given fruits commensurate to their labor, as part of a discussion of the relationship of
notions of justice and capitalism. General equilibrium theories are even connected to Structuralism
within the philosophy of science [32]. One prominent application of the economics of public goods
has been to study environmental (non-)cooperation [11, 41]. Our work extends such applications
by connecting market equilibria ideas to voting on different issues in a fair and efficient way, as
discussed above.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formally defines the models of private
goods allocation, public decision-making, and Fisher markets. Section 3 shows that issue pricing
can result in (very) poor equilibria for public decisions markets. Section 4 presents the concept
of pairwise issue expansion, and shows how this can be used to obtain optimal equilibria, as well
as other properties. Section 4.3 gives examples of Fisher market results that we can import to
the public decisions setting using our reduction. Section 5 focuses on a particular such result:
taˆtonnement. Finally, Appendix A discusses the connection to [22] and Lindahl equilibria in more
depth. Proofs are also deferred to the appendix.
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2 Model
We first introduce general notation that applies to both private goods allocation and public decision-
making. As much as possible, we intentionally use the same notation for the private and public
settings, as one of our primary contributions is to highlight the connections between these. We
then discuss our assumptions on utility functions. Finally we discuss aspects specific to private
goods and specific to public decision-making.
Let [k] denote the set {1, 2, . . . , k}. A private goods instance consists of a set of agents N = [n]
and a set of goods M = [m]; a public decisions instance consists of a set of agents N = [n] and
a set of issues M = [m]. We will typically use i and k to denote agents, and j and ℓ to denote
goods/issues. We assume that issues are binary, meaning that each issue j has two alternatives: 0
and 1. Each agent i ∈ N has a preferred alternative for each issue j, denoted by aij, which they
truthfully report.
We assume that goods/issues are divisible, meaning that a single good/issue can split among
multiple agents. In a public decision instance, divisibility can be interpreted as randomization
over alternatives. An outcome of a private goods instance is an allocation x ∈ [0, 1]m×n, where
xi ∈ [0, 1]
m is the bundle given to agent i, and xij ∈ [0, 1] is the fraction of good j given to agent i.
An allocation cannot allocate more than the available supply10: x is valid only if
∑
i∈N xij ≤ 1 for
all j ∈ M . The outcome of a public decisions instance is denoted by z = (z1, . . . , zm) ∈ [0, 1]m×2,
where zj = (zj,0, zj,1) ∈ [0, 1]2, and zj,a ∈ [0, 1] is the probability put on alternative a for issue j.
An outcome z is valid only if
∑
a∈{0,1} z
j,a ≤ 1 for all j ∈M .
2.1 Utility functions
In a private goods instance, we use ui(x) ∈ R to denote i’s utility for allocation x; in a public
decisions instance, we use ui(z) ∈ R to denote i’s utility for outcome z. In a private goods instance,
it is assumed that an agent’s utility depends on only the bundle she receives: ui(x) = ui(xi). In a
public decisions instance, agents do not receive separate bundles: instead, the group makes a single
decision that affects all agents. We will assume that agents only have utility for their preferred
alternative: this will let us standardize notation as follows. For a public decisions outcome z, let
xij(z) = z
j,aij for all i ∈ N and j ∈ M (we will typically write xij(z) = xij for brevity). Then we
can define agent i’s public bundle as xi = (xi1, . . . , xim). An agent’s public bundle represents the
fraction of the public decision allocated to her preferred alternative, and so we have ui(z) = ui(xi)
in a public decisions instance as well.
Throughout the paper, we make the following standard assumptions on each agent’s utility
function ui:
1. Continuous: ui : [0, 1]
m → R≥0 is a continuous function.
2. Normalized: ui(0, 0, ...0) = 0.
3. Non-constant: There exists a bundle xi where ui(xi) > 0.
4. Monotone: For any bundles xi and x
′
i where xij ≥ x
′
ij for all j, ui(xi) ≥ ui(x
′
i).
5. Concave: For any bundles xi and x
′
i and constant λ ∈ [0, 1], we have ui(λxi + (1 − λ)x
′
i) ≥
λui(xi) + (1− λ)ui(x
′
i).
10Although the entire supply is typically allocated, it is standard in the private goods literature to allow for
outcomes where this does not occur, i.e.
∑
i∈N
xij < 1. This will be discussed in Section 2.2.
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6. Homogeneous of degree 1: For any bundles xi and x
′
i and constant λ ≥ 0 where xij = λx
′
ij
for all j, ui(xi) = λui(x
′
i).
The first five are standard assumptions in the market literature. The last is less ubiquitous, but
still common: in particular, the vast majority of the popular subclasses of utility functions satisfy
this assumption. For example, it is often assumed in real-world applications that utility functions
are linear, meaning that
ui(xi) =
∑
j∈M
wijxij
where wij ≥ 0 is the weight agent i has for good j. Another important class is Leontief functions,
where
ui(xi) = min
j∈M :wij 6=0
xij
wij
Linear utilities imply that goods are independent, whereas Leontief utilities represent perfect com-
plements: goods that only have value in combination. For Leontief utilities, wij is the relative
proportion agent i needs of good j.
Both Linear and Leontief utilities are generalized by the class of constant elasticity of substitution
(CES) utilities, where ui(xi) =
( ∑
j∈M
wρijx
ρ
ij
)1/ρ
for some constant ρ ∈ (−∞, 0) ∪ (0, 1]. Linear
utilities are obtained by setting ρ = 1, and taking the limit as ρ approaches −∞ yields Leontief
utilities. Taking the limit as ρ approaches 0 gives Cobb-Douglas utility functions, which have the
form ui(xi) =
( ∏
j∈M
x
wij
ij
)1/∑j∈M wij11.
While many of our results hold for any utility functions satisfying our six assumptions, some
hold only for particular subclasses; we will make it clear when this is the case.
2.2 Private goods & Fisher markets
In this work, we primarily consider private goods instances that are Fisher markets. A Fisher
market [7] is a private goods instance (N,M) where each agent i also has a budget Bi ≥ 0. Each
agent’s budget can be interpreted as her relative importance. We would typically expect all agents
to have the same importance, especially in public decision-making, but allow for the possibility of
different budgets for completeness.
For prices p = (p1, . . . , pm) ∈ R
m
≥0, bundle xi is affordable for agent i if xi ·p =
∑
j∈M xijpj ≤ Bi.
agent i’s demand set for prices p is
Di(p) = argmax
xi∈Rm≥0: xi·p≤Bi
ui(xi)
i.e., the set of her favorite affordable bundles. A market equilibrium (ME) (x, p) is an allocation x
and prices p where
1. Each agent receives a bundle in her demand set: xi ∈ Di(p).
2. The market clears: for all j,
∑
i∈N
xij ≤ 1. Also, if pj > 0, then
∑
i∈N
xij = 1.
11The weights wij have different interpretations for Leontief utilities vs other CES utilities. For example, if there is
only a single good, the CES utility form reduces to wi1xi1 and the Leontief utility form reduces to xi1/wi1. When we
say that taking the limit as ρ → −∞ yields Leontief utilities, we mean that we obtain the form of Leontief utilities
(i.e., a minimization over all the goods).
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The most natural case is when all agents have the same budget, in which case the ME is also called
the competitive equilibrium from equal incomes [50].
Condition 2 states that the demand never exceeds the supply, and that any good whose supply
is not fully exhausted must have price zero. This implies that agents have no utility for the leftover
goods: otherwise they would simply buy more with no additional cost. Note that agents can
demand more of a good than the available supply if the cost is less than their budget. It is the role
of prices at equilibrium to ensure that demand does not exceed supply.
Under the first five assumptions on utility functions described in Section 2.1, a market equi-
librium is guaranteed to exist for any Fisher market instance [3]. With the addition of the sixth
assumption (homogeneity of degree 1), the equilibrium allocations are exactly the allocations max-
imizing the Nash welfare12:
NW (x) =
(∏
i∈N
ui(xi)
Bi
)1/B
where B =
∑
i∈N Bi. Maximum Nash welfare allocations can be computed in polynomial time by
the celebrated Eisenberg-Gale (EG) convex program [18, 19]13. The Nash welfare has been lauded
as a compromise between fairness and efficiency, and it will be the primary objective function we
seek to maximize.
2.3 Public decisions
As in the private markets case, the maximum Nash welfare outcome can be found via a convex
program:
max
z∈[0,1]m×2
(∏
i∈N
ui(z)
Bi
)1/B
s.t. zj,0 + zj,1 ≤ 1 ∀j ∈M (1)
The solution to this convex program can be found in polynomial time. This program is very
different than the EG program; however, we will show via our reduction that these programs become
identical under a transformation of utility functions and issue space.
Furthermore, even without any knowledge of utility functions, a 1/2 approximation of this
program emerges. Because issues are binary, we can very easily guarantee each agent half of her
maximum possible utility simply by putting equal probability on each alternative, i.e., zj,0 = zj,1 =
1/2. It follows from concavity and ui(0, 0, ..., 0) = 0 that this also achieves 1/2 of the maximum
possible Nash welfare.
Proposition 2.1. Let Γ be a public decisions instance (N,M) with agent budgets B = (B1...Bn),
and let z be the outcome where zj,0 = zj,1 = 1/2 for all j ∈M . Then
max
z
′
NW (z′)
NW (z)
≤ 214.
In light of this, we would expect any reasonable mechanism for public decision-making to do no
worse than this (in terms of Nash welfare), and hopefully do substantially better. Unfortunately,
we show in the next section that the natural adaption of Fisher markets to the public decisions
setting does no better than this for several important classes of utility functions. Even worse, in
the case of linear utilities – the most important class of utilities in practice – the Nash welfare can
be a factor of O(n) worse than optimal.
12This is technically the “budget-weighted” Nash welfare, but we will omit “budget-weighted” throughout the
paper.
13This correspondence still holds under slightly weaker assumptions that our six assumptions [34].
14Whenever we maximize over outcomes of a public decisions instance, i.e., maxzNW (z), we implicitly assume
that only valid outcomes are considered, meaning that zj,0 + zj,1 ≤ 1 for all j ∈ M . The same is true when we
maximize over outcomes of a private goods instance, and we adopt these conventions throughout the paper.
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3 Inefficiency of public decisions markets with issue pricing
In a Fisher market, each good is assigned a single price which is common to all agents: thus
all agents are treated the same, which is desirable for fairness. This section shows that in the
public decisions setting, setting a single price for each issue (issue pricing) can result in very poor
equilibria. Although we primarily consider Nash welfare in this paper, the same family of instances
will show that the utilitarian welfare (sum of agent utilities) and egalitarian welfare (the minimum
agent utility) can also be much worse than optimal.
A public decisions market (PDM) consists of a public decisions instance (N,M) along with
agent budgets B = (B1 . . . Bn). This definition is independent of the pricing scheme: we use the
term “PDM” to describe all notions of markets for the public decisions setting. This section uses
the following scheme: each issue has a price, each agent uses her budget to purchase probability
for her preferred alternatives, and the total probability placed on an alternative is the sum over
agents of the probability purchased for that alternative.
Given per-issue prices p ∈ Rm≥0, a private bundle yi ∈ R
m
≥0 is affordable if yi ·p ≤ Bi. Throughout
the paper, we will use yi to refer to i’s private bundle, and xi to refer to i’s public bundle. This
distinction only matters in the public decisions setting: we use yi and xi interchangeably in the
private goods setting.
In this section, for private bundles y = (y1...yn), the corresponding outcome z = (z
1...zm) ∈
[0, 1]m×2 is
zj,a =
∑
i∈N : aij=a
yij
The above definition of z as a function of y is specific to the issue pricing scheme. The different
pricing scheme discussed in Section 4 will define z differently.
In a Fisher market, an agent’s demand set contains the bundles which maximize her utility
subject to being affordable. In a PDM with issue pricing, an agent’s utility depends not only on
her own bundle, but also on other agent’s bundles. Thus if we want to define an agent’s demand
set as the bundles which maximize her utility subject to being affordable, the demand set must
depend not only on the prices, but also on the private bundles of other agents. With this in mind,
we define the demand set by
Di(p, y−i) = argmax
yi∈Rm≥0: yi·p≤Bi
ui(y−i, yi)
where y−i is the list of private bundles other than that of agent i, and with slight abuse of types,
ui(y−i, yi) is agent i’s utility for the outcome when i purchases private bundle yi and the other
agents purchase private bundles y−i
15.
An issue-pricing market equilibrium (IME) (y, p) is a list of private bundles y and issue prices
p ∈ Rm≥0 where
1. Each agent receives a private bundle in her demand set: yi ∈ Di(p, y−i).
2. The market clears: for all j,
∑
i∈N
yij ≤ 1. Also, if pj > 0, then
∑
i∈N
yij = 1.
By the same reasoning as in the private setting, whenever an issue is not sold completely, agents
have no utility for the unsold fraction of the issue16.
15As in the Fisher market setting, agents are allowed to demand more than 1 unit of an issue if the cost is less than
their budget. The interpretation of demanding more than unit probability is difficult, but the prices will ensure that
this never occurs in equilibrium.
16If some issue j is not sold completely and so zj,0 + zj,1 < 1, one can think of the remaining 1− zj,0 − zj,1 being
allocated to some third option that has no value for any agent.
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In general it is not known whether every PDM admits an IME. However, for several important
utility classes, we give an instance where an IME does exist, but where every IME has poor Nash
welfare.
3.1 Linear utilities
We first show that for linear utilities, an IME always exists. Furthermore, the set of IMEs is
identical to the set of private goods MEs that would be obtained if the input were instead treated
as a Fisher market (i.e., if each agent’s utility only depended on her private bundle).
To see this, we can write agent i’s utility for private bundles y as
ui(y) =
∑
j∈M
wij
∑
k∈N :
akj=aij
ykj =
∑
j∈M
wijyij +
∑
j∈M
wij
∑
k∈N\{i}:
akj=aij
ykj
Agent i cannot affect the actions of other agents, and so has no control over the second term. Thus
agent i maximizes her utility by maximizing the first term,
∑
j∈M wijyij, which is exactly the utility
function of an agent in a Fisher market. This is expressed formally by Theorem 3.1, whose proof
appears in Appendix C.
Theorem 3.1. For a PDM (N,M,B) with linear utilities given by weights wij ≥ 0, for every list
of private bundles y and list of prices p, (y, p) is an IME if and only (y, p) is a ME for the Fisher
market (N,M,B) with linear utilities given by the same weights.
We now define the family of instances that exhibit poor equilibria in the issue pricing model.
For any integer n ≥ 2 and real number w ≥ 0, let Φ(n,w) be the PDM defined by n = m, wii = w
for all i, wij = 1 for all j 6= i, aii = 0, aij = 1 for all j 6= i, and Bi = 1 for all i. In words, on each
issue i, agent i is alone on one side of the issue, and the other n−1 agents are on the opposite side.
Each agent i has weight w for issue i, and weight 1 for every other issue.
Our next theorem shows that for linear utilities, the Nash welfare of the IME can be a linear
factor worse than optimal. This is especially dreadful in light of how easy it is to achieve half of
the optimal Nash welfare via Proposition 2.1.
Theorem 3.2. For any ǫ > 0, Φ(n, 1+ǫ) with linear utilities has a unique equilibrium (y, p), where
max
z
′
NW (z′)
NW (y)
≥
n− 1
1 + ǫ
The proof is in Appendix Section C, but we give some intuition here. We observe that an agent’s
demand set in a Fisher market always maximizes her “bang-per-buck” ratio: wij/pj . To see this,
suppose agent i spends some money on a good that does not maximize her bang-per-buck ratio:
she could instead spend the same amount of money to get strictly more utility by spending it on a
good with maximum bang-per-buck. By Theorem 3.1, this property carries over to the IME.
By symmetry, every issue will have the same price. Since wii > wij for all i and for all j 6= i,
agent i’s bang-per-buck ratio is maximized only by good i. Thus each agent i spends all of her
budget on good i. This leads to the outcome where yii = 1 for all i, and yij = 0 for all j 6= i. Thus
zj,0 = 1 for all j ∈M . The utility of each agent for this outcome 1 + ǫ, so the Nash welfare is also
1+ ǫ. But in the outcome where zj,1 = 1, for all j, each agent has utility n− 1, so the Nash welfare
is n− 1. This yields the desired bound of (n− 1)/(1 + ǫ).
If we used wii = wij = 1 for all i, j, the outcome where z
j,0 = 1 would still be an IME. However,
there would now be many more IMEs, including ones with optimal Nash welfare. By setting
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wii = 1+ǫ instead of wii = 1, we can make the outcome where xii = 1 for all i the unique equilibrium.
This same issue is not present for Cobb-Douglas and CES utilities with ρ ∈ (−∞, 0)∪ (0, 1), which
we examine in the next section.
3.2 Other utilities
We briefly mention two results we have for other classes of utility functions. Using the same
Φ construction, Theorems 3.3 and 3.4 state that the Nash welfare of an IME cannot be much
better than 1/2 for Cobb-Douglas utilities and CES utilities, respectively. The formal proofs of
Theorems 3.3 and 3.4 appear in Appendix C.1.
Theorem 3.3. For any IME (y, p) of Φ(n, 1) with Cobb-Douglas utilities,
max
z
′
NW (z′)
NW (y)
≥
2− 2/n
(n− 1)1/n
Theorem 3.4. For any IME (y, p) of Φ(n, 1) with CES utilities for parameter ρ ∈ (−∞, 0)∪(0, 1),
max
z
′
NW (z′)
NW (y)
≥ 2(1 − 1/n)1/ρ
As the number of agents approaches infinity, the bounds in Theorems 3.3 and 3.4 approach 2.
This means that for those classes of utility functions, the issue pricing market model cannot be
guaranteed to do better than simply picking the midpoint on every issue (Proposition 2.1). The
situation is even worse for linear utilities, where the Nash welfare of an IME can be arbitrarily
worse than the optimal Nash welfare.
One may wonder why Cobb-Douglas and CES utilities with ρ ∈ (−∞, 0) ∪ (0, 1) do not fail as
badly as linear utilities on this family of instances. On a high level, the reason is that both Cobb-
Douglas and CES utilities exhibit diminishing returns: the more one buys of a particular good,
the less value it adds. This leads to agents splitting their money across multiple goods, regardless
of their weights on the individual goods. As a result, small changes in agents’ weights end up not
affecting their purchases too much. In contrast, for linear utilities, an agent might spend her entire
budget on a single good: in fact, if there is a unique good which maximizes her bang-per-buck, she
must spend her entire budget on that good. This is exactly the property we use in our inefficiency
example, where the fact the wii = 1 + ǫ > wij for j 6= i causes agent i to spend her entire budget
on good i.
These negative results motivate a more complex market model, which we present in the next
section.
4 Pairwise issue expansion and pairwise pricing
In this section, we describe a more complex model of a public decisions market, which relies on
pairwise pricing : for each issue, there will be a price for each pair of agents who disagree on that
issue. We then present our main result: a reduction from any PDM to an equivalent Fisher market.
This reduction, which we call pairwise issue expansion, can be used to construct a pairwise pricing
equilibrium that maximizes the Nash welfare.
The section is organized as follows. Section 4.1 introduces pairwise issue expansion and gives
an informal argument for correctness. Section 4.2 gives some additional notation and setup, and
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states our theorems. The formal proofs of correctness are somewhat technical and appear only in
the appendix. Finally, Section 4.3 discusses some Fisher market results that this reduction allows
us to immediately lift to the public decisions setting.
4.1 Pairwise issue expansion
For any PDM Γ, we construct a Fisher market R(Γ) as follows. The set of agents N = {1...n}
and their budgets B1...Bn will be the same. Every issue j ∈M will become O(n
2) goods in R(Γ).
Specifically, for every issue j, there will one good for each pair of agents who disagree on issue j.
Let R(M) be the set of goods in R(Γ): then
R(M) =
{
(i, k, j) | j ∈M, i, k ∈ N, aij 6= akj
}
We we will refer to goods (k, k′, j) where i ∈ {k, k′} as agent i’s “pairwise goods”. Note that (i, k, j)
and (k, i, j) refer to the same good.
If yi is a bundle associated with Γ (denoted yi ∼ Γ), then yi ∈ R
|M |
≥0 . If yi is a bundle associated
with R(Γ) (denoted yi ∼ R(Γ)), then yi ∈ R
|R(M)|
≥0 .
We will use j to represent issues in M and ℓ to represent goods in R(M). We also use yi(ikj) to
denote yiℓ when ℓ = (i, k, j).
In order to purchase α units of issue j in the PDM, agent i will need to purchase at least α
units of all of her pairwise goods for issue j. Formally, agent i’s utility for a bundle yi ∈ R
|R(M)|
≥0 is
ui

 min
k∈N :
ai1 6=ak1
yi(ik1), min
k∈N :
ai2 6=ak2
yi(ik2), . . . min
k∈N :
aim 6=akm
yi(ikm)


Agent i’s utility is as if she purchased min
k∈N :aij 6=akj
yi(ikj) probability of each issue j in the PDM Γ.
For example, if agent i’s utility in Γ is linear with weights wij , her utility in R(Γ) would be∑
j∈M
wij
(
min
k∈N :
aij 6=akj
yi(ikj)
)
These utility functions are nested Leontief ; this will be discussed formally in Section 4.2.
Figure 1 gives a graphical representation of R(Γ) for five agents and a single issue j, where
a1j = a2j = a3j = 0 and a4j = a5j = 1. An edge from an agent to a good indicates that that agent
desires that good. One key aspect of pairwise issue expansion is that on each issue j, each agent
is in competition with everyone she disagrees with, and not in competition with anyone she agrees
with.
We first argue informally for the correctness of the reduction. Agent i will only ever spend
money on her pairwise goods, because other goods do not affect her utility. Because of the nested
Leontief structure of the utilities in R(Γ), for a fixed issue j, agent i will buy the same amount
of each of her pairwise goods: buying a larger amount of one of the goods would not increase her
utility (because it would not increase the minimum), so she would be wasting money. Thus for
a fixed issue, agent i buys the same amount of each of her pairwise goods (though this can differ
across issues).
So suppose that for each issue j, agent i buys αij of each of her pairwise goods for that issue.
If R(Γ) is at equilibrium, every agent k who disagrees with agent i on issue j can receive at most
1 − αij of good (i, k, j), since the total supply of each good is 1. As argued above, agent k will
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Figure 1: A graphical representation of the constructed Fisher market R(Γ) for five agents and a
single issue j, where a1j = a2j = a3j = 0 and a4j = a5j = 1.
never buy more than 1−αij of any of her pairwise goods on issue j, because of the nested Leontief
structure. Thus every agent k who disagrees with agent i on issue j will buy exactly 1−αij of each
of her pairwise goods for issue j. This leaves exactly αij for everyone who agrees with agent i on
issue j. Thus in equilibrium, everyone who agrees with agent i buys αij of their pairwise goods on
issue j, and everyone who disagrees with agent j buys 1− αij of their pairwise goods on issue j.
This means that when R(Γ) is in equilibrium, whenever two agents agree on an issue, they buy
the same amount of their pairwise goods for that issue, and whenever they disagree, the amounts
they buy sum to 1. Let z be the outcome where zj,aij = αij and z
j,1−aij = 1 − αij for all j ∈ M .
Then z is a valid outcome of the PDM. Also, because R(Γ) is a Fisher market, an equilibrium price
vector assigns a single price to each good: this yields a price for each pairwise disagreement on each
issue. This leads to the pairwise pricing equilibrium notion, which z as defined above will satisfy.
Furthermore, we know that any Fisher market equilibrium maximizes Nash welfare. The agents
will have the same utilities in both the PDM and the constructed Fisher market at equilibrium,
so the Fisher market equilibrium will respond to a pairwise pricing equilibrium which maximizes
Nash welfare in the PDM.
Finally, we mention that this reduction can be generalized to d-ary issues under the assumption
that each agent has utility for at most one alternative per issue. Instead of one good for each pair
of agents who disagree, there would be one good for each set of d agents where each agent has a
different preferred alternative, and a similar argument will hold.
4.2 Additional setup and formal theorem statements
Some additional notation will be useful. We define relations R and R← which will map bundles
and prices between Γ and R(Γ).
For a bundle yi ∼ Γ, we define a corresponding bundle R(yi) ∼ R(Γ) by
R(yi)(kk′j) =
{
yij if i ∈ {k, k
′}
0 if i 6∈ {k, k′}
∀(k, k′, j) ∈ R(M)
where R(yi)(kk′j) denotes the quantity of good (k, k
′, j) in bundle R(yi). For a bundle yi ∼ R(Γ),
the corresponding bundle R←(yi) ∼ Γ is defined by
R←(yi)j = min
k∈N :
aij 6=akj
yi(ikj) ∀j ∈M
where R←(yi)j denotes the quantity of issue j in bundle R
←(yi). Also, for a list of private bundles
y ∼ Γ, we use R(y) to refer to the list of private bundles in R(Γ) where agent i’s bundle is R(yi).
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Similarly, for any y ∼ R(Γ), R←(y) is a list of private bundles in Γ where agent i’s bundle is
R←(yi).
It is important to note that while the equilibria of Γ and R(Γ) coincide, the correspondence is
not always meaningful for non-equilibrium outcomes. In particular, not every yi ∼ R(Γ) satisfies
yi = R(R
←(yi)): for example if yi(kk′j) > 0 when i 6∈ {k, k
′}.
Let ui be agent i’s utility function in Γ. Then agent i’s utility function in R(Γ) is given by
uRi (yi) = ui(R
←(yi))
This is equivalent to the definition of agent utilities given in Section 4.1: simply subtitute the
definition of R←(yi). Also note that for any yi ∼ Γ, we have yi = R
←(R(yi)), and so ui(yi) =
uRi (R(yi)).
We would also like to relate prices in Γ and R(Γ). Since R(Γ) is a Fisher market, any price
vector p associated with R(Γ) (denoted p ∼ R(Γ)) assigns a single price to each good ℓ ∈ R(M):
p ∈ R
|R(M)|
≥0 . We will be considering per-person per-issue prices for the PDM Γ, so any set of prices
p associated with Γ (denoted p ∼ Γ) assigns one price to each person i ∈ N for each issue j ∈ M :
p ∈ Rm×n≥0 .
For a price vector p ∼ R(Γ), we define prices R←(p) ∼ Γ by
R←(p)ij =
∑
k∈N :
aij 6=akj
p(ikj) ∀i ∈ N, j ∈M
where R←(p)ij is the price of issue j for agent i in price vector R
←(p). In words, R←(p)ij is the
sum of agent i’s pairwise prices for issue j. We will also use R←(p)i to denote the vector of agent
i’s prices: R←(p)i = (R
←(p)i1...R
←(p)im).
Before we stating our theorems, we should verify that the utilities in R(Γ) satisfy the necessary
requirements. If the utility functions in Γ are in class H (H could be the set of linear utility
functions, for example), the utility functions in R(Γ) will be H-nested Leontief.
Definition 4.1. For some agent i, let fi1, fi2...fiL be Leontief utility functions. Then a utility
function ui is H-nested-Leontief if there exists a utility function hi : R
L
≥0 → R≥0 such that hi ∈ H,
and
ui(yi) = hi
(
fi1(yi), fi2(yi) . . . fiL(yi)
)
for any bundle yi.
In our setting, L = m for all agents, and for each j ∈M , fij(yi) = R
←(yi)j = min
k∈N :aij 6=akj
yi(ikj).
Then for each agent i, uRi (yi) = ui(R
←(yi)) = ui
(
fi1(yi), fi2(yi)...fiL(yi)
)
.
The next lemma states that as long as hi and fi1, fi2...fiL satisfy our assumptions on utility
functions, their composition does as well.
Lemma 4.1. Suppose that the functions hi, fi1, fi2 . . . fiL are continuous, normalized, concave,
homogeneous of degree 1, non-decreasing, and non-constant. Then ui = hi(fi1, fi2 . . . fiL) meets the
same conditions.
We will claim that each market equilibrium in R(Γ) corresponds to a pairwise-pricing market
equilibrium (PME) in Γ. The formal definition of a PME appears in Appendix B.1. Informally, it
is a list of private bundles y and per-person per-issue prices p ∈ Rm×n≥0 generated by pairwise issue
expansion (i.e., p = R←(p′) for some p′ ∼ R(Γ)) such that
1. Every agent receives a private bundle in her demand set.
2. Whenever two agents agree on an issue, they purchase the same amount of that issue.
3. Whenever two agents disagree on an issue, they amounts of that issue that they purchase
sum to 1.
This is exactly the definition alluded to via the αij variables in the informal argument given in
Section 4.1. This leads to the following theorem:
Theorem 4.2. For an allocation y ∼ R(Γ) and prices p ∼ R(Γ), (y, p) is a ME of the market
R(Γ) if and only if (R←(y), R←(p)) is a PME of the PDM Γ.
Finally, we wish to claim the maximum Nash welfare outcomes in Γ and R(Γ) correspond. We
will actually prove this correspondence for all welfare functions, not just the Nash welfare, and even
for approximations of welfare functions.
Formally, let Ψ : Rn≥0 → R be a function. When the n inputs to Ψ are understood to be
the n agent utilities for a particular outcome (of a pubic or private instance), we call Ψ a wel-
fare function. Because Ψ depends only on the agent utilities, we will use this terminology and
notation for both the public and private settings. With slight abuse of types, we will write
Ψ(z) = Ψ(u1(z), u2(z), ...un(z))
17.
Common welfare functions include the utilitarian welfare function, Ψ(z) =
∑
i∈N ui(z), the egal-
itarian welfare function, Ψ(z) = mini∈N ui(z), and most importantly for us, the (budget-weighted)
Nash welfare function, Ψ(z) =
(∏
i∈N ui(z)
Bi
)1/B
. We say that an outcome z is a α-approximation
of Ψ if
Ψ(z) ≥ α ·max
z
′∼Γ
Ψ(z′)
If z is an outcome of a public decisions instance, technically R(z) does not typecheck, since
z = (z1...zm) is not a list of bundles. We interpret R(z) to mean R(x1, x2...xn), where xi is agent
i’s public bundle as induced by z.
Theorem 4.3. Let Ψ be a welfare function, let Γ be the public decisions instance (N,M) with
budgets B1...Bn, and let α ≥ 0. Then z is an α-approximation of Ψ in Γ if and only if R(z) is an
α-approximation of Ψ in R(Γ).
Note that by the same reasoning, z ∼ R(Γ) is an α-approximation of Ψ if and only if R←(z) ∼
Γ is also an α-approximation of Ψ. Thus for any welfare function Ψ and any α ≥ 0, the α-
approximations of Γ and R(Γ) correspond exactly.
4.3 Lifting Fisher markets results using pairwise issue expansion
In addition to uncovering a surprising conceptual connection, pairwise issue expansion allows us
to immediately lift many results from the Fisher market literature to the public decision-making
setting. In particular, if a result holds for Fisher market with H-nested Leontief utilities, it holds
in the public decisions setting for H utilities. Any Fisher market result regarding the ME can be
lifted using Theorem 4.2, and any Fisher market result regarding any approximation of any welfare
function can be lifted using Theorem 4.3. The following Fisher market results are known:
17Throughout most of the paper, we use z to refer to the outcome of a public decisions instance and x to refer to
the outcome of a private goods instance. In this discussion, the welfare functions are the same for both public and
private instances, so we will use z to denote outcomes for both.
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1. There exists a strongly polynomial-time algorithm for finding a Fisher market equilibrium
with two agents and any utility functions [10]18.
2. There exists a strongly polynomial-time algorithm for finding a Fisher market equilibrium for
Leontief utilities with weights in {0, 1} [24].
3. There exists a polynomial-time algorithm for a Fisher market with Leontief utilities which
yields a O(log n) approximation simultaneously for all canonical welfare functions (i.e. Nash
welfare, utilitarian welfare, egalitarian welfare, etc) [30].
The first two can be lifted using Theorem 4.2, and the third can be lifted using Theorem 4.3.
Note that nested Leontief-Leontief functions are just Leontief functions. This yields the following
PDM results:
1. There exists a strongly polynomial-time algorithm for finding a PME with two agents and
any utility functions.
2. There exists a strongly polynomial-time algorithm for finding a PME for Leontief utilities
with weights in {0, 1}.
3. There exists a polynomial-time algorithm for a PDM with Leontief utilities which yields a
O(log n) approximation simultaneously for all canonical welfare functions (i.e. Nash welfare,
utilitarian welfare, egalitarian welfare, etc).
The final result we are interested in lifting is a discrete-time taˆtonnement process for finding the
Fisher market equilibrium for nested CES-Leontief utilities that converges in polynomial-time [4].
The next section discusses this in more depth.
As a final comment, there are also results of interest that do not immediately fall under the
framework of Theorems 4.2 and 4.3, but which we conjecture could be lifted using our reduction.
For example, [28] studies Leontief utilities in the context of price curves, where the cost of a good
may be any increasing function of the quantity purchased (as opposed to just a linear function, as is
usually assumed). We believe that pairwise issue expansion could be used to generate pairwise price
curves, where there would be a price curve assigned to each pair of agents who disagree on an issue,
instead of a single price. Pairwise issue expansion seems general enough to apply to non-standard
market models, such as that of [28], but we leave it for future work.
5 Public market taˆtonnements
In this section, we describe how the reduction immediately leads to existence of several public
market taˆtonnements. In particular, we show that any Fisher market taˆtonnement that works for
H-nested utilities yields a PDM taˆtonnement for H utilities.
This does not immediately follow from pairwise issue expansion for several reasons. The first is
that taˆtonnement deals with approximate equilibria, and Theorem 4.2 only considers exact equilib-
ria. Because this correspondence holds for approximate equilibria as well (see proof of Theorem 5.4),
any Fisher market taˆtonnement that works for H-nested utilities immediately yields an algorithm
for computing PDM equilibria for H utilities, but not a taˆtonnement. A true PDM taˆtonnement
would only have access to agents’ demands in the PDM, but the resulting algorithm would need
18For completeness, we mention an additional mild condition required for this result: the polytope containing the
set of feasible utilities of the two agents must be able to be described via a combinatorial LP.
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Figure 2: R←(T ) illustration using a hidden private market taˆtonnement
to elicit agents’ demands in the constructed Fisher market. We handle this by running the Fisher
market taˆtonnement as a hidden subroutine within the PDM taˆtonnement, as demonstrated by
Figure 2.
Let a Fisher market taˆtonnement T be an iterative algorithm that starts at an initial price
vector p0, and then at each time t,
1. Receives demand set Di(p
t)19 from each agent i.
2. Updates prices as some function g of the demands, pt+1 = gT (p
t,D(pt)).
As time increases, prices and associated demands approach an approximate equilibrium, for some
notion of approximate. Figure 2 illustrates the meta-algorithm for public market taˆtonnements.
From a Fisher market taˆtonnement T , let R←(T ) be the induced public market taˆtonnement that
initializes an initial price vector p0 in the hidden Fisher market and then at each time t,
1. Converts prices pt to public market prices R←(pt) and shows them to agents.
2. Receives demand set Di(R
←(pt)) from each agent i.
3. Converts the agent demands to the associated private market demand set yR = {R(yi)}yi∈Di(R←(pt)).
4. Updates prices through the Fisher market taˆtonnement function, pt+1 = gT (p
t,yR).
We begin with the definitions of approximate equilibria and convergence.
Definition 5.1. A δ-equilibrium (x, p) in a Fisher market is an allocation x and prices p where
1. Each agent receives a bundle in her demand set: xi ∈ Di(p).
2. pj > δ =⇒
∑
i∈N
xij > 1− δ
3. ∀j,
∑
i∈N
xij ≤ 1 + δ
Note that this definition is introduced in [4].
Definition 5.2. A δ-PME (y, p) is a list of private bundles y and per-person per-issue prices
p ∈ Rm×n≥0 where
19With strictly concave utility functions, each agent’s demand at a given price is unique. With linear utilities, the
demand set can be expressed as the set of goods that are equally desirable at the given prices. Also, we assume that
agents are price-taking, meaning that they honestly report their demand given a set of prices, and do not anticipate
how prices will change as a result of their actions.
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1. Each agent receives a private bundle in her demand set: yi ∈ Di(pi).
2. The market approximately clears: there exists a outcome z = (z1...zm) ∈ [0, 1]m×2 where for
every issue j ∈M , all of the following hold:
(a) zj,0 + zj,1 ≤ 1 + δ
(b) For all i ∈ N , yij ≤ z
j,aij + δ. If pij > nδ, then yij > z
j,aij − δ.
Definition 5.3. A taˆtonnement T has converged to a δ-equilibrium at time T if ∃y where (y, pT )
is a δ-equilibrium. Similarly, R←(T ) has converged to a δ-PME at time T if ∃y where (y, R←(pT ))
is a δ-PME.
The definition does not imply that all demands at the equilibrium prices form an approximate
equilibrium, only that there exists an allocation consistent with demands at the equilibrium prices
such that the supply constraints are met. However, note that when utility functions are strictly
concave, demands are unique.
Our first theorem shows that any Fisher market taˆtonnement for H-nested Leontief utility
functions yields a PDM taˆtonnement for H utility functions. Theorem 5.1, whose proof appears
in the appendix, allows one to lift both convergence and convergence rates from Fisher market
taˆtonnements.
Theorem 5.1. Consider a Fisher market taˆtonnement T . Suppose T converges to a δ-equilibrium
for H-nested leontief utilities in O(κ(m,n, δ)) time steps, where n is the number of agents and
m the number of goods. Then R←(T ) converges to a 3δ-PME for the PDM with H utilities in
O(κ(n2m,n, δ)).
One Fisher market taˆtonnement that we can lift using Theorem 5.1 comes from [4], which gives
a polynomial-time taˆtonnement that converges to a δ-equilibrium for CES-Leontief utilities with
ρ ∈ (−∞, 0)∪ (0, 1) in polynomial time. By Theorem 5.1, this yields a PDM taˆtonnement for CES
utilities.
We would also like a PDM taˆtonnement that works for a wider range of utility functions,
especially linear utilities. Section D presents a stochastic gradient descent style taˆtonnement for
Fisher markets which converges asymptotically to an equilibrium for all EG utility functions20,
following the framework of [13]. Combined with Theorem 5.1, this taˆtonnement implies existence
of a PDM taˆtonnement with asymptotic convergence to an equilibrium for all EG utility functions.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we studied adaptations of markets to the public decision-making setting. In Section 3,
we showed that issue pricing in the public decisions setting can yield very poor equilibria: for linear
utilities, the Nash welfare can be a factor of O(n) worse than optimal. This is in contrast to private
goods, where per-good pricing is the accepted standard, and yields optimal equilibria. We showed
in Section 4 that pairwise issue expansion reduces any public decisions market to an equivalent
Fisher market, how optimal equilibria can be constructed using this reduction. We used pairwise
issue expansion to lift various Fisher market results to the public decision-making context, including
taˆtonnement, which we discussed in Section 5.
20functions that meet the 5 conditions from Section 2.
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Most importantly, our reduction uncovers a powerful connection between the private goods
and public decision-making settings that we believe has many possible applications. For example,
suppose we had a mechanism for private goods which computes some desirable outcome other than
maximum Nash welfare (maybe it computes the allocation which maximizes the minimum utility,
for example). If that algorithm works for nested H-Leontief utilities for private goods, we imagine
that it could be immediately lifted to work for H utilities in for public-decisions. More generally, it
seems like more or less any result that applies to H-Leontief utilities for private goods would apply
for H utilities for public decisions. We believe this merits more study.
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A Lindahl Equilibria
In this section, we show how our public decisions setting corresponds to a natural public goods
market in the setting of Lindahl equilibria, and how our reduction can also be used to compute
Lindahl prices for this public goods market. The Lindahl Equilibrium has a long history and,
at times, the term has been used to mean slightly different things [49]. Foley [22] gave general
conditions for the existence of the Lindahl Equilibrium and its correspondence to the core. We first
introduce a simplified definition of Lindahl Equilibria.
Definition A.1 ([22, 49]). A Lindahl Equilibrium with m public goods, 1 private good, n agents,
and entry private good amounts {wi}
n
i=1 is an (public goods allocation, private goods allocation,
per-person per-issue price) vector (z∗ ∈ Rm+ , {y
∗
i ∈ R+}
n
i=1, {p
∗
i ∈ R
m
+}
n
i=1) such that
1. z∗ is a solution to maxz
(∑n
j=1 p
∗
j
)
z − c(z)
2. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, (z∗, y∗i ) is a solution to max(z,yi) ui(z, yi) subject to p
∗
i z + yi ≤ wi
where c(z) is the cost to produce the public good vector z in terms of the private good and ui is the
participant utility function in terms of the public and private goods.
In a Public Decision Market, the private good is the “influence” of each agent, for which agents
have no utility, i.e., influence not spent is lost. Furthermore, there are 2 public goods per issue, 1
for each alternative, and each with the same price for each agent. Similarly,
c(z) =
{
0 zj,0 + zj,1 ≤ 1 ∀j
∞ else
i.e., if in the case in which each alternative on each issue is implemented with some probability,
then there is no cost of using the entire probability, and no possibility of creating more probability.
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Lemma A.1. An equilibrium (z∗ ∈ R2×m+ , {y
∗
i ∈ R+}
n
i=1, {p
∗
i ∈ R
2×m
+ }
n
i=1) of the PDM with m
issues and agent budgets Bi, where z
∗ is the decision vector, p∗ are the per-person per-issue prices
from the Fisher market reduction, and final influence vectors are y∗i = 0, is a Lindahl Equilibrium
with entry private good amounts wi = Bi.
Proof. Condition 2 follows directly from the equilibrium condition that optimal allocation is in
the demand set of each agent at the equilibrium prices. Condition 1 requires a bit more work.
Note that ∀j, for each copy of the good, the sub-price pikj = pkij, where aij 6= akj. Then,
∀j, p0j =
∑
i:aij=a
∑
k:akj 6=a
pikj =⇒ p
0
j = p
1
j . Thus, all feasible x are in the solution set in the first
condition, and an equilibrium of the PDM is feasible.
Lemma A.1, alongside Theorem 4.2 and the existence of Fisher market equilibria [3] establishes
the existence of a Lindahl equilibrium in our setting.
We note that Lemma A.1 further establishes that the solution is in the core, as Lindahl Equilibria
are in the core [22].
A.1 Economies with public goods
The existence of Lindahl Equilibria in Public Good economies (of which Public Decision Markets
are a special case, as we will show) was established by Foley [22]. The chief technique is a reduction
to Private Goods economies. The reduction yields a non-constructive existence proof, and operates
as follows: create a copy of each good for each participant, with equality of the amount of each
good enforced through conic constraints. Then, the proof is finished by invoking the existence of
equilibria satisfying certain conditions in Private Goods economies, after showing that the addi-
tional constraints restricting the cone of production do not violate any assumptions [17]. We note
that existence of Lindahl equilibria of the PDM can also be established non-constructively through
the same technique, by showing that the resulting market satisfies the assumptions in [22].
One natural question is how Foley’s reduction to private goods compares to the reduction in
this work. Equation (2) contains the convex program to find MNW through Foley’s reduction. We
use s ∈ {0, 1} to denote each side of the issue. Equation (3) contains our reduction, which has a
nested utility function structure.
max
x∈[0,1](2×m)×n
(∏
i∈N
ui(xi)
Bi
)1/B
s.t. x0ij + x
1
ij ≤ 1 ∀j ∈M, i ∈ N (2)
xsij = x
s
kj ∀j ∈M, i, k ∈ N, s ∈ {0, 1}
max
v∈[0,1]m×n,x∈[0,1]n˜
(∏
i∈N
ui(vi)
Bi
)1/B
s.t. vij ≤ xi(ikj) ∀j ∈M, i, k ∈ N, aij 6= akj (3)
xi(ikj) + xk(ikj) ≤ 1 ∀j ∈M, i, k ∈ N, aij 6= akj
Where n˜ is 2(# of disagreement pairs across issues). Both programs can be solved in polynomial
time. However, Foley’s reduction does not obviously resemble a Fisher market due to the extra
equality constraints.
Comment A.1. Program (2) does not transform into a Fisher market.
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Proof. We write the Lagrangian of the Program (2), with the objective function written in log
form.
L(x, p, q) =
∑
i
Bi log(ui(xi))−
∑
i,j
pij(x
0
ij + x
1
ij) +
∑
i,j
pij −
∑
i 6=k,j,s
qsikj(x
s
ij − x
s
kj)
s.t. p ≥ 0, x ≥ 0, qsikj ≥ 0
This Lagrangian has per-person per-issue prices qsikj, pij for each side of each issue that cannot
be trivially turned into per-good prices with separate goods not having joint constraints. If one
considers each (i, j, s) tuple a good in the Fisher market, the two goods associated with the two
sides of each issue, x0ij , x
1
ij are coupled through pij . Similarly, if pair (i, j) corresponds to a good,
goods across individuals xsij , x
s
kj are coupled through q
s
ikj in a way that does not resemble supply
constraints. Merging the goods for each side, such that the good represents the probability on one
of the alternatives for each issue, would violate the non-decreasing constraint for utility functions.
Eliminating or combining either of these variables would amount to eliminating the corresponding
constraints. This coupling prevents a non-trivial mapping to the Fisher market case, which does
not have cross-good constraints but has per-good prices.
Our reduction fills this gap for Public Decision markets, showing that these prices can emerge
from a pure Fisher market with a modification of buyer utilities. In Program (3), there is a good
(i, k, j) for each (i, k) pair that disagrees on issue j, with i’s utility function only dependent on the
amount i buys, xikj. This program thus yields goods with per-good pricing (on the Fisher market
goods) and no cross-goods constraints.
Proposition A.2. Programs (2) and (3) are equivalent.
Proof. Both are equivalent to Program (1), which we repeat below:
max
z∈[0,1]2×m
(∏
i∈N
ui(z)
Bi
)1/B
s.t. zj,0 + zj,1 ≤ 1 ∀j ∈M
Program (2) and (1) are immediately equivalent by combining variables. The equivalence of the
reduction (Theorem 4.2) establishes that Program (3) and PDM Program (1) have the same solu-
tion.
B Omitted definitions and proofs from Section 4
Section B.1 contains the formal definitions of the pairwise pricing model. Section B.2 contains the
formal analysis of R and R←, leading to Theorems 4.2 and 4.3.
B.1 Pairwise pricing
In the issue pricing model of Section 3, the price for an issue was the same for all agents, and the
amount of probability put on alternative a on issue j in the outcome (denoted zj,a) was the sum of
the agents’ purchases. Formally, Section 3 defined zj,a =
∑
k∈N : aij=a
yij where yij is the probability
that agent i purchased on issue j (yi is agent i’s private bundle).
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The definition of zj,a will be different here. This section describes a model where agents may
have different prices for the same issue. This will allow us to enforce that in equilibrium, all agents
who agree on issue j will purchase the same amount of issue j. For every i ∈ N and j ∈M where
agent i’s price for issue j is nonzero, at equilibrium21 we will have
zj,aij = yij
The key consequence is that each agent’s private and public bundles will be the same in equilibrium,
and so ui(yi) = ui(xi(z)). Thus each agent’s utility can be written as a function of only her private
bundle: this will enable the reduction to private goods.
We now formally describe the personalized pricing model. For prices p ∈ Rm×n≥0 , let pij be the
price for agent i for issue j, and let pi = (pi1...pim). Formally, a private bundle yi is affordable if
yi ·pi =
∑
j∈M yijpij ≤ Bi. Because we will have ui(yi) = ui(xi) in equilibrium, we can define agent
i’s demand to be independent of other agents’ private bundles22:
Di(p) = argmax
yi∈Rm≥0: yi·pi≤Bi
ui(yi)
A personalized-pricing market equilibrium (PME) (y, p) is a list of private bundles y and per-
sonalized prices p ∈ Rm×n≥0 where
1. Each agent receives a private bundle in her demand set: yi ∈ Di(pi).
2. The market clears: there exists an outcome z = (z1...zm) ∈ [0, 1]m where for every issue
j ∈M , all of the following hold:
(a) zj,0 + zj,1 = 1
(b) For all i ∈ N , yij ≤ z
j,aij . If pij > 0, then yij = z
j,aij .
The market clearing condition (Condition 2) is different than in traditional private goods mar-
kets. Instead of the sum of the agent’s demands being equal to the supply, the condition here is
that there is a single outcome that is consistent with every agent’s demand. Roughly speaking,
this means that whenever two agents agree on an issue, they demand the same quantity of that
issue, and whenever two agents disagree, the sum of their demands equals the supply. This can be
thought of as all agents buying the “same” private bundle, modulo their preferred alternatives.
At equilibrium, z is treated as the outcome of the public decisions instance. However, z may
not be unique: if yij < z
j,aij for some i, j, there may be multiple outcomes compatible with the list
of agent demands. The following proposition shows that all outcomes compatible with y are more
or less the same.
Proposition B.1. Let (y, p) be a PME. Then for any outcome z satisfying the market clearing
condition, ui(z) = ui(yi) for all i ∈ N .
Proof. Fix some agent i ∈ N , and let y′i be the private bundle where y
′
ij = z
j,aij for all j ∈M . For
every issue j where yij 6= z
j,aij , we have pij = 0. Thus yi and y
′
i have the same cost. Since yi is in
agent i’s demand set, yi is affordable. Thus y
′
i is also affordable. Suppose ui(z) = ui(y
′
i) > ui(yi):
then yi would not be in agent i’s demand set, which is a contradiction.
21The outcome will not be well-defined for a list of private bundles not at equilibrium, since agents may have
incompatible demands. This will not be important; we mention it only for completeness.
22We assume that agents truthfully report their demands according to this definition: recall that we do not consider
strategic behavior.
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Since each agent’s private and public bundles are the same at equilibrium in this model, we
mostly omit “private” and “public” and just use the term “bundle”. We reserve z for denoting the
overall outcome of the PDM, and just use yi to denote agent i’s bundle.
B.2 Formal analysis of pairwise issue expansion
We begin with Lemma B.2, which states that as long as agents only buy their pairwise goods, the
cost of a bundle yi ∼ R(Γ) at prices p is the same as the cost of bundle R
←(yi) ∼ Γ at prices
R←(p). The proof primary consists of arithmetic and substituting definitions.
Lemma B.2. Given prices p ∼ R(Γ) and a bundle yi ∼ R(Γ),
1. R←(yi) · R
←(p)i ≤ yi · p
2. Suppose that (1) for any j ∈ M and k, k′ ∈ N\{i} where yi(kk′j) 6= 0, we have p(kk′j) = 0,
and (2) for any j ∈ M and k ∈ N where yi(ikj) 6= min
k∈N :
aij 6=akj
yi(ikj), we have p(ikj) = 0. Then
R←(yi) · R
←(p)i = yi · p.
Proof. Suppose yi is a bundle in R(Γ). The cost of yi at prices p is
yi · p =
∑
ℓ∈R(M)
yiℓpℓ (by definition)
=
∑
j∈M
∑
k,k′∈N :
akj 6=ak′j
yi(kk′j)p(kk′j) (rewriting each good ℓ ∈ R(M) as a triple (i, k, j))
≥
∑
j∈M
∑
k∈N :
aij 6=akj
yi(ikj)p(ikj) (only including agent i’s pairwise goods in the sum)
≥
∑
j∈M
∑
k∈N :
aij 6=akj
p(ikj) min
k′∈N :
aij 6=ak′j
yi(ik′j) (replacing each yi(ikj) with min
k′∈N :
aij 6=ak′j
yi(ik′j))
=
∑
j∈M
∑
k∈N :
aij 6=akj
p(ikj)R
←(yi)j (by definition)
=
∑
j∈M
R←(yi)j
∑
k∈N :
aij 6=akj
p(ikj) (moving R
←(yi)j out of the inner sum)
=
∑
j∈M
R←(yi)jR
←(p)ij (by definition)
= R←(yi) ·R
←(p)i (by definition)
Furthermore, the first inequality holds with equality if for any j ∈ M and k, k′ ∈ N\{i} where
yi(kk′j) 6= 0, p(kk′j) = 0. Similarly, the second inequality holds with equality if for any j ∈ M
and k ∈ N where yi(ikj) 6= min
k∈N :
aij 6=akj
yi(ikj), p(ikj) = 0. Therefore under those two assumptions,
R←(yi) · R
←(p)i = yi · p.
Lemma B.3 is a simple application of Lemma B.2.
Lemma B.3. For prices p ∼ R(Γ) and a bundle yi ∼ Γ, we have yi ·R
←(p)i = R(yi) · p.
Proof. By definition of R(yi), we have (1) yi(kk′j) = 0 for all j ∈ M and k, k
′ ∈ N\{i}, and (2)
yi(ikj) = min
k∈N :
aij 6=akj
yi(ikj) for all j ∈M and k ∈ N . Then by Lemma B.2, yi ·R
←(p)i = R(yi) · p.
Lemma B.4 states that if a bundle yi ∼ R(Γ) is agent i’s demand set D
R
i (p), then (1) yi contains
only agent i’s pairwise goods, and (2) for a fixed issue j, yi contains the same amount of each of
her pairwise goods. The proof is based on the informal argument given before: violating either (1)
or (2) wastes money that could be spend to increase her utility.
Lemma B.4. Given prices p ∼ R(Γ), suppose a bundle yi ∼ R(Γ) is in D
R
i (p). Then (1) for any
j ∈M and k, k′ ∈ N\{i} where yi(kk′j) 6= 0, we have p(kk′j) = 0, and (2) for any j ∈M and k ∈ N
where yi(ikj) 6= min
k∈N :
aij 6=akj
yi(ikj), we have p(ikj) = 0.
Proof. First, suppose for sake of contradiction that there exists j ∈ M and k, k′ ∈ N\{i} where
p(kk′j) > 0 and yi(kk′j) > 0. Consider the bundle y
′
i ∼ R(Γ) which is identical to yi, except
that y′i(kk′j) = 0. Since R
←(yi) = R
←(y′i), we have u
R
i (yi) = u
R
i (y
′
i). But since pj > 0, the
yi · p− y
′
i · p = yi(kk′j)p(kk′j). Consider the bundle y
′′
i ∼ R(Γ) where for all ℓ ∈ R(M),
y′′iℓ = y
′
iℓ +
yi(kk′j)p(kk′j)∑
ℓ′∈R(M) pℓ′
Then we have y′′i · p = y
′
i · p + yi(kk′j)p(kk′j) = yi · p. Since yi ∈ D
R
i (p), yi is affordable at prices p.
Thus y′′i is affordable at prices p.
Finally, we show that uRi (y
′′
i ) > u
R
i (yi). We have y
′′
iℓ > y
′
iℓ for all ℓ ∈ R(M). Thus for all ℓ,
there exists a constant αℓ > 1 where y
′′
iℓ = αℓy
′
iℓ. Let α = minℓ∈R(M) αℓ. Then y
′′
iℓ ≥ αy
′
iℓ for all
ℓ ∈ R(M). Because uRi is homogenous of degree 1 and monotone, we have u
R
i (y
′′
iℓ) ≥ α · u
R
i (y
′
iℓ) >
uRi (y
′
iℓ) = u
R
i (yi).
Thus we have uRi (y
′′
iℓ) > u
R
i (yiℓ) and y
′′
i · p = y
′
i · p. But then yi cannot be in agent i’s demand
set, which is a contradiction.
The second case is similar. Suppose that there exists j ∈ M and k ∈ N where p(ikj) > 0 and
yi(ikj) > min
k′∈N :
aij 6=ak′j
yi(ik′j). Define the bundle y
′
i ∼ R(Γ) to be identical to yi, except that yi(ikj) =
min
k′∈N :
aij 6=ak′j
yi(ik′j). Define the bundle y
′′
i ∼ R(Γ) by
y′′iℓ = y
′
iℓ +
(
yi(ikj) − min
k′∈N :
aij 6=ak′j
yi(ik′j)
)
p(ikj)
∑
ℓ′∈R(M) pℓ′
Then uRi (y
′′
i ) > u
R
i (y
′
i) = u
R
i (yi), and y
′′
i · p = yi · p. Thus yi cannot be in agent i’s demand set,
which is a contradiction.
Lemma B.5 is a straightforward combination of the previous two lemmas.
Lemma B.5. Given prices p ∼ R(Γ), suppose a bundle yi ∼ R(Γ) is in D
R
i (p). Then R
←(yi) ·
R←(p)i = yi · p.
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Proof. By Lemma B.4, we have (1) for any j ∈ M and k, k′ ∈ N\{i} where yi(kk′j) 6= 0, we have
p(kk′j) = 0, and (2) for any j ∈ M and k ∈ N where yi(ikj) 6= min
k∈N :
aij 6=akj
yi(ikj), we have p(ikj) = 0.
Therefore by Lemma B.2, we have R←(yi) · R
←(p)i = yi · p.
Lemma B.6 states that yi is in agent i’s demand set in R(Γ) if and only if R
←(yi) is in agent i’s
demand set in Γ. This will not only play an important role in the proof of Theorem 4.2, but also
later on in taˆtonnement.
The majority of the proof of Lemma B.6 is devoted to proving that
max
y′i∼Γ:
y′i·R
←(p)i≤Bi
ui(y
′
i) = max
y′i∼R(Γ):
y′i·p≤Bi
uRi (y
′
i)
The intuitive argument for the above equality is that the utilities and costs of bundles are
the same in both Γ and R(Γ). Slightly more formally, for any bundle yi ∼ Γ, R(yi) ∼ R(Γ) has
the same utility (by definition) and the same cost (by Lemma B.3). For any bundle yi ∼ R(Γ),
uRi (yi) = ui(R
←(yi)) is also true by definition, but yi and R
←(yi) do not necessarily have the same
cost. That is where Lemma B.5 will be important.
Lemma B.6. Given prices p ∼ R(Γ) and a bundle yi ∼ R(Γ), yi ∈ D
R
i (p) if and only if R
←(yi) ∈
Di(R
←(p)).
Proof. Lemma B.3 states that y′i · R
←(p)i = R(y
′
i) · p for any bundle y
′
i ∼ Γ. This implies the
following set equivalence:
{y′i | y
′
i ∼ Γ and y
′
i ·R
←(p)i ≤ Bi} = {y
′
i | y
′
i ∼ Γ and R(y
′
i) · p ≤ Bi}
Next, recall that for any bundle y′i ∼ Γ, R
←(R(y′i)) = y
′
i, so
{y′i | y
′
i ∼ Γ and y
′
i ·R
←(p)i ≤ Bi} = {R
←(R(y′i)) | y
′
i ∼ Γ and R(y
′
i) · p ≤ Bi}
For every bundle y′i ∼ Γ, R(y
′
i) is a bundle in R(Γ). Therefore we can replace R(y
′
i) with y
′
i and get
{R←(R(y′i)) | y
′
i ∼ Γ and R(y
′
i) · p ≤ Bi} ⊆ {R
←(y′i) | y
′
i ∼ R(Γ) and y
′
i · p ≤ Bi}
Note that the relationship is now subset instead of equality. This is because there may be some
y′i ∼ R(Γ) that does not equal R(y
′′
i ) for any y
′′
i ∼ Γ. Combining this subset relationship with the
previous equality gives us
{y′i | y
′
i ∼ Γ and y
′
i ·R
←(p)i ≤ Bi} ⊆ {R
←(y′i) | y
′
i ∼ R(Γ) and y
′
i · p ≤ Bi}
Since ui(R
←(y′i)) = u
R
i (y
′
i) by definition, we have
{ui(y
′
i) | y
′
i ∼ Γ and y
′
i ·R
←(p)i ≤ Bi} ⊆ {u
R
i (y
′
i) | y
′
i ∼ R(Γ) and y
′
i · p ≤ Bi}
Taking the max gives us
max
(
{ui(y
′
i) | y
′
i ∼ Γ and y
′
i · R
←(p)i ≤ Bi}
)
≤ max
(
{uRi (y
′
i) | y
′
i ∼ R(Γ) and y
′
i · p ≤ Bi}
)
which we can rewrite as
max
y′i∼Γ:
y′i·R
←(p)i≤Bi
ui(y
′
i) ≤ max
y′i∼R(Γ):
y′i·p≤Bi
uRi (y
′
i)
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Consider an arbitrary y′′i ∈ D
R
i (p): then
uRi (y
′′
i ) = max
y′i∼R(Γ):
y′i·p≤Bi
uRi (y
′
i)
and y′′i · p ≤ Bi. Then by Lemma B.5, R
←(y′′i ) · R
←(p)i = y
′′
i · p ≤ Bi. Since R
←(y′′i ) ∼ Γ and
R←(y′′i ) ·R
←(p)i ≤ Bi, we have
max
y′i∼Γ:
y′i·R
←(p)i≤Bi
ui(y
′
i) ≥ ui(R
←(y′′i ))
By definition, uRi (y
′′
i ) = ui(R
←(y′′i )), so
max
y′i∼R(Γ):
y′i·p≤Bi
uRi (y
′
i) = u
R
i (y
′′
i ) = ui(R
←(y′′i )) ≤ max
y′i∼Γ:
y′i·R
←(p)i≤Bi
ui(y
′
i) ≤ max
y′i∼R(Γ):
y′i·p≤Bi
uRi (y
′
i)
Therefore,
max
y′i∼Γ:
y′i·R
←(p)i≤Bi
ui(y
′
i) = max
y′i∼R(Γ):
y′i·p≤Bi
uRi (y
′
i)
Finally, suppose yi ∈ D
R
i (p): then yi · p ≤ Bi, and by Lemma B.5 we have R
←(yi) · R
←(p)i =
yi · p ≤ Bi. Also,
ui(R
←(yi)) = u
R
i (yi) = max
y′i∼R(Γ):
y′i·p≤Bi
uRi (y
′
i) = max
y′i∼Γ:
y′i·R
←(p)i≤Bi
ui(y
′
i)
so R←(yi) ∈ Di(R
←(p)). Suppose R←(yi) ∈ Di(R
←(p)): then R←(yi) · R
←(p)i ≤ Bi. Since
yi = R(R
←(yi)), we have yi · p = R
←(yi) ·R
←(p)i ≤ Bi. Also,
uRi (yi) = ui(R
←(yi)) = max
y′i∼Γ:
y′i·R
←(p)i≤Bi
ui(y
′
i) = max
y′i∼R(Γ):
y′i·p≤Bi
uRi (y
′
i)
Therefore yi ∈ D
R
i (p).
Recall that for any bundle yi ∼ Γ, R
←(R(yi)) = yi. Thus by Lemma B.6, R(yi) ∈ D
R
i (p) if
and only if yi = R
←(R(yi)) ∈ Di(p). This is expressed by Corollary B.6.1, which will be useful in
Section 5 when considering taˆtonnement processes in the PDM.
Corollary B.6.1 (of Lemma B.6). Given prices p ∼ R(Γ) and a bundle yi ∼ Γ, yi ∈ Di(R
←(p)) if
and only if R(yi) ∈ D
R
i (p).
Theorem 4.2. For an allocation y ∼ R(Γ) and prices p ∼ R(Γ), (y, p) is a ME of the market
R(Γ) if and only if (R←(y), R←(p)) is a PME of the PDM Γ.
Proof. ( =⇒ ) Suppose (y, p) is a ME of the Fisher market R(Γ): then yi ∈ D
R
i (p) for all i ∈ N ,
and
∑
i∈N
yiℓ = 1 or pℓ = 0 for all ℓ ∈ R(M). By Lemma B.6, we have R
←(yi) ∈ Di(R
←(p)).
We define x = (x1...xm) ∈ [0, 1]m×2 as follows:
xj,0 = max
i∈N :aij=0
R←(yi)j (4)
xj,1 = 1− xj,0
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for all j ∈M . We claim that for all i ∈ N and j ∈M , R←(yi)j ≤ x
j,aij , and that R←(yi)j = x
j,aij
if R←(p)ij > 0.
We first show that R←(yi)j ≤ x
j,aij for all i, j. When aij = 0, this is true by definition, so
assume aij = 1. Since (y, p) is a ME of R(Γ), for any ℓ ∈ R(M), we have
∑
k′∈N yk′ℓ ≤ 1. Thus for
any k ∈ N where aij 6= akj (i.e. akj = 0), we have
∑
k′∈N yk′(ikj) ≤ 1.
Also, recall that by definition, R←(yi)j = mink∈N :aij 6=akj yi(ikj). Thus R
←(yi)j ≤ yi(ikj) for all
k. Similarly, R←(yk)j ≤ yk(ikj). Therefore
R←(yi)j +R
←(yk)j ≤ yi(ikj) + yk(ikj) ≤
∑
k′∈N
yk′(ikj) ≤ 1 ∀k ∈ N : akj = 0 (5)
R←(yi)j + max
k∈N :akj=0
R←(yk)j ≤ 1 (6)
R←(yi)j ≤ 1− max
k∈N :akj=0
R←(yk)j = x
j,1 (7)
Thus R←(yi)j ≤ x
j,aij for all i ∈ N . It remains to show that R←(yi)j = x
j,aij whenever R←(p)ij >
0.
Suppose for sake of contradiction there exists i ∈ N and j ∈ M where R←(yi)j < x
j,aij and
R←(p)ij > 0. Since R
←(yi)j = min
k∈N :aij 6=akj
yi(ikj), there must exist k ∈ N where aij 6= akj and
yi(ikj) < x
j,aij . Since R←(p)ij =
∑
k′∈N :aij 6=ak′j
p(ik′j), there must exist k
′ where p(ik′j) > 0.
If yi(ik′j) > yi(ikj), we have p(ik′j) = 0 by Lemma B.4. Thus assume yi(ik′j) ≤ yi(ikj) < x
j,aij .
We showed above that R←(yk′)j ≤ x
j,ak′j = 1 − xj,aij : thus yk′(ik′j) ≤ 1 − x
j,aij . Therefore
yi(ik′j)+ yk′(ik′j) < x
j,aij +1−xj,aij = 1. If there exists i′ 6∈ i, k′ where yi′(ik′j) > 0, then p(ik′j) = 0,
which is a contradiction. Therefore
∑
ℓ∈R(M) yiℓ = yi(ik′j) + yk′(ik′j) < 1.
But then by the definition of a ME, we have p(ik′j) = 0, which is again a contradiction. Therefore
R←(yi)j = x
j,aij whenever R←(p)ij > 0. This shows that (R
←(y), R←(p)) is a PME of Γ.
( ⇐= ) Suppose (R←(y), R←(p)) is a PME of the PDM Γ. Then R←(yi) ∈ Di(R
←(p)) for all
i ∈ N , so yi ∈ D
R
i (p) by Lemma B.6. Also, there exists x = (x
1...xm) ∈ [0, 1]m×2 where for all
i ∈ N and j ∈M ,
1. xj,0 + xj,1 = 1
2. R←(yi)j ≤ x
j,aij
3. R←(yi)j = x
j,aij whenever R←(p)ij = 0.
It remains to show that for all ℓ ∈ R(M), either
∑
i∈N yiℓ = 1 or pℓ = 0. Suppose for sake
of contradiction that there exists ℓ = (i, k, j) ∈ R(M) where
∑
k′∈N yk′(ikj) < 1 and p(ikj) > 0. If
there exists k′ 6∈ {i, k} where yk′(ikj) > 0, then p(ikj) = 0 by Lemma B.4. Thus∑
k′∈N
yk′(ikj) = yi(ikj) + yk(ikj) < 1
Furthermore, if either yi(ikj) 6= R
←(yi)j or yk(ikj) 6= R
←(yk)j , we have p(ikj) = 0 again by
Lemma B.4. Thus yi(ikj) = R
←(yi)j and yk(ikj) = R
←(yk)j , so
R←(yi)j +R
←(yk)j < 1
Recall that R←(yi)j ≤ x
j,aij and R←(yk)j ≤ x
j,akj , and that xj,aij + xj,akj = 1 since aij 6= akj.
Thus in order for R←(yi)j + R
←(yk)j < 1 to be true, either R
←(yi)j < x
j,aij or R←(yk)j < x
j,akj .
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By symmetry, suppose R←(yi)j < x
j,aij without loss of generality. Then because (R←(y), R←(p))
is a PME, we have R←(p)ij = 0.
By definition, R←(p)ij =
∑
k′∈N :aij 6=ak′j
p(ik′j). Since p(ik′j) ≥ 0 for all i, k
′, j, we have p(ik′j) for
all k′ ∈ N where aij 6= ak′j . But then p(ikj) = 0, which is a contradiction. Thus for all ℓ ∈ R(M),
either
∑
i∈N yiℓ = 1 or pℓ = 0. Therefore (y, p) is a ME of R(Γ).
Theorem 4.3. Let Ψ be a welfare function, let Γ be the public decisions instance (N,M) with
budgets B1...Bn, and let α ≥ 0. Then z is an α-approximation of Ψ in Γ if and only if R(z) is an
α-approximation of Ψ in R(Γ).
Proof. We first claim that R(x) is a valid allocation in R(Γ), meaning that
∑
i∈N R(xi)ℓ ≤ 1 for
all ℓ ∈ R(M). By definition of R(xi), R(xi)(kk′j) = 0 whenever i 6∈ {k, k
′}, and R(xi)(kk′j) = xij
whenever i ∈ {k, k′}. Therefore, for all ℓ ∈ R(M),∑
i∈N
R(xi)ℓ =
∑
i,k,k′∈N
R(xi)(kk′j) = R(xi)(ikj) +R(xk)(ikj) = xij + xkj
By definition of R(M), the fact that good (i, k, j) exists implies that aij 6= akj. Since x is a
valid outcome of Γ, for all j ∈ M we must have xij + xkj ≤ 1 whenever aij 6= akj. Therefore∑
i∈N R(xi)ℓ ≤ 1. Since this holds for all ℓ ∈ R(M), R(x) is a valid allocation in R(Γ).
By definition of R← and uRi , we have u
R
i (xi) = ui(R
←(xi)). Since Ψ depends only on the
agents’ utilities, we have Ψ(x′) = Ψ(R(x′)) for any outcome x′ ∼ Γ. Similarly, recall that ui(x
′
i) =
uRi (R(x
′
i)) for any bundle x
′
i ∼ Γ, so Ψ(x
′) = Ψ(R←(x′)) for any outcome x′ ∼ R(Γ).
Thus for every possible outcome of Γ, there is an outcome of R(Γ) which has the same value of
Ψ, and for every possible outcome of R(Γ), there is an outcome of Γ which has the same value of
Ψ. Therefore we have the numeral equality
max
x
′∼Γ
Ψ(x′) = max
x
′∼R(Γ)
Ψ(x′)
Finally, because Ψ(x) = Ψ(R(x)), we have Ψ(x) ≥ α ·max
x
′∼Γ
Ψ(x′) if and only if Ψ(R(x)) ≥ α ·
max
x
′∼R(Γ)
Ψ(x′). Therefore x is an α-approximation of Ψ in Γ if and only if R(x) is an α-approximation
of Ψ in R(Γ).
C Other omitted proofs
C.1 Omitted proofs from Section 3
Theorem 3.1. For a PDM (N,M,B) with linear utilities given by weights wij ≥ 0, for every list
of private bundles y and list of prices p, (y, p) is an IME if and only (y, p) is a ME for the Fisher
market (N,M,B) with linear utilities given by the same weights.
Proof. Let Γ be the PDM (N,M,B) with linear utilities ui given by weights wij , and Γ˜ be the
Fisher market (N,M,B) with linear utilities u˜i given by the same weights.
Let (y, p) be an IME of Γ: then yi ∈ Di(p, y−i) for all i. Let xi be agent i’s public bundle in y,
let y′ = (y−i, y
′
i) for an arbitrary private bundle y
′
i, and let x
′
i be agent i’s public bundle for private
bundles y′. Then we have
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ui(y−i, yi) = max
y′i: y
′
i·p≤Bi
ui(y−i, y
′
i)∑
j∈M
wijxij = max
y′i: y
′
i·p≤Bi
∑
j∈M
wijx
′
ij
∑
j∈M
wij
∑
k∈N :
akj=aij
ykj = max
y′i: y
′
i·p≤Bi
(∑
j∈M
wijy
′
ij +
∑
j∈M
wij
∑
k∈N\{i}:
akj=aij
ykj
)
∑
j∈M
wijyij +
∑
j∈M
wij
∑
k∈N\{i}:
akj=aij
ykj = max
y′i: y
′
i·p≤Bi
(∑
j∈M
wijy
′
ij +
∑
j∈M
wij
∑
k∈N\{i}:
akj=aij
ykj
)
∑
j∈M
wijyij +
∑
j∈M
wij
∑
k∈N\{i}:
akj=aij
ykj = max
y′i: y
′
i·p≤Bi
(∑
j∈M
wijy
′
ij
)
+
∑
j∈M
wij
∑
k∈N\{i}:
akj=aij
ykj
∑
j∈M
wijyij = max
y′i: y
′
i·p≤Bi
∑
j∈M
wijy
′
ij
u˜i(yi) = max
y′i: y
′
i·p≤Bi
u˜i(y
′
i)
Also, the total price of yi is yi · p in both Γ and Γ˜. Let D˜i(p) be agent i’s demand set for prices
p in Γ˜: then by the above chain of equations, if yi ∈ Di(p, y−i) for any y−i, we have yi ∈ D˜i(p).
Furthermore, the exact same chain of equations in reverse order shows that if yi ∈ D˜i(p), then
yi ∈ Di(p, y−i) for all y−i.
Since yi ∈ D˜i(p), the allocation y in Γ˜ gives each agent a bundle in her demand set given prices
p. Also, because (y, p) is an IME of Γ, we have that
∑
i∈N yij ≤ 1, and
∑
i∈N yij = 1 whenever
pj > 0. Therefore (y, p) is a ME of Γ˜.
Now let (y, p) be a ME of Γ˜. Since yi ∈ D˜i(p) implies yi ∈ Di(p, y−i), we have that y in Γ
gives each agent a bundle in her demand set. By the definition of ME, we have
∑
i∈N yij ≤ 1, and∑
i∈N yij = 1 whenever pj > 0. Therefore (y, p) is an IME of Γ.
Theorem 3.2. For any ǫ > 0, Φ(n, 1+ǫ) with linear utilities has a unique equilibrium (y, p), where
max
z
′
NW (z′)
NW (y)
≥
n− 1
1 + ǫ
Proof. Let Φ′(n, 1+ǫ) be the Fisher market with the same agents, goods, and weights as Φ(n, 1+ǫ),
also with linear utilities. Let (y, p) be a ME of Φ′(n, 1 + ǫ). Then yi · p = Bi = 1 for all i, and so∑
j∈M pj = B = n.
We next observe for a Fisher market with linear utilities, any (private) bundle in an agent’s
demand set maximizes her “bang-per-buck” ratio: wij/pj . To see this, consider agent i moving δ
of her budget to a good that does not maximize her bang-per-buck: this would decrease her utility,
and so that bundle cannot be in her demand set.
Suppose for sake of contradiction that there exists ℓ where pℓ 6= 1. Since
∑
j∈M pj = n, there
must exist ℓ where pℓ < 1. Let ℓ = minj∈M pj. Since wℓℓ > wℓj for all j 6= ℓ, only issue ℓ maximizes
agent ℓ’s bang-per-buck. Thus there is a single bundle yi in her demand set, and it consists of her
spending her entire budget on issue ℓ. But since pℓ < 1 = Bℓ, agent ℓ purchases more of good ℓ
than exists in the supply, and so the market cannot clear. Thus any ME of Φ′(n, 1 + ǫ) must have
pj = 1 for all j.
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Now assume that pj = 1 for all j. Since for each agent i, wii = w > 1 = wij for all j 6= i,
the only bundle that maximizes agent i’s bang-per-buck consists of her spending her entire budget
on issue i. Thus the unique ME is (y, p) where yii = 1 for all i, and yij = 0 whenever i 6= j.
Furthermore, by Theorem 3.1, (y, p) is the unique IME of Φ(n, 1 + ǫ).
The Nash welfare of y in Φ(n, 1 + ǫ) is
NW (y) =
(∏
i∈N
∑
j∈M
wijyij
)1/n
=
(∏
i∈N
1 + ǫ
)1/n
= 1 + ǫ
Now consider the outcome z where zj,0 = 0 and zj,1 = 1 for all j ∈M . Let xij be agent i’s public
bundle, as usual. Then
NW (z) =
(∏
i∈N
∑
j∈M
wijxij
)1/n
=
(∏
i∈N
∑
j∈M\{i}
1 · xij
)1/n
=
(∏
i∈N
(n− 1)
)1/n
= n− 1
and therefore
max
z
′
NW (z′)
NW (y)
≥
n− 1
1 + ǫ
We now present the proofs of Theorems 3.3 and 3.4, which state that issue-pricing equilibria
can be inefficient for Cobb-Douglas and CES utilities, respectively.
We first prove a lemma motivated by the following concept. In Section 3.1, we described how
for linear utilities, the bundles in an agent’s demand set maximize her bang-per-buck, in both
the public and private settings. This is not true in general for other utilities, since goods are not
independent. However, the same concept still applies: agent i will not spend any money on issue
j if there is another issue ℓ where she has a higher marginal utility per dollar spent on issue ℓ.
This concept will be made formal by examining
∂(ui(xi))
∂xij
, which is the partial derivative of agent
i’s utility with respect to xij. Although these derivatives may be complicated in general, they are
well-behaved for Cobb-Douglas and CES utilities with ρ ∈ (−∞, 0) ∪ (0, 1).
We will use this concept to show that for Cobb-Douglas utilities, xijpj = minℓ∈M xiℓpℓ for any
issue j that agent i is spending any money on. For CES utilities with ρ ∈ (−∞, 0) ∪ (0, 1), we will
show that x1−ρij pj = minℓ∈M x
1−ρ
iℓ pℓ (note that 1 − ρ > 0 since ρ ∈ (−∞, 0) ∪ (0, 1)). Using these
two properties, the following lemma will imply that xij = 1/2 for all j, which allows us to compute
the Nash welfare.
Lemma C.1. Let (y, p) be an IME of Φ(n, 1) and let xi be agent i’s public bundle as induced by
y. Suppose that there exists c > 0 such that for every issue j that agent i spends any money on,
xcijpj = min
ℓ∈M
xciℓpℓ. Then xij = 1/2 for all i and j.
Proof. The majority of the proof will be dedicated to showing that for every agent i, there must
exist an issue j where xcijpj ≤ 1/2
c. Suppose for sake of contradiction that there exists an agent i
where xcijpj > 1/2
c for every issue j.
We first show that there must exist an agent k and issue j where xckjpj < 1/2. Because (y, p)
is an IME, all agents exhaust their budgets, so
∑
j∈M pj =
∑
k∈N Bk = n. Because |M | = n here,
there must exist j ∈ M where pj ≤ 1. Since x
c
ijpj > 1/2
c, we have xij > 1/2. Let k be any agent
where akj 6= aij : then xkj < 1/2, and so x
c
kjpj < 1/2
c.
We know by definition of Φ(n, 1), agents i and k agree on all issues other than i and k: aiℓ = akℓ
whenever ℓ 6∈ {i, k}. Thus for all issues ℓ 6∈ {i, k}, xckℓpℓ > 1/2
c > xckjpj. By assumption, agent k
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only spends money on issues ℓ which minimize xckℓpℓ. Thus agent k does not spend money on any
issues besides i and k (note that either j = i or j = k).
Therefore amount of money agent k spends in total is
∑
ℓ∈M ykℓpℓ = ykkpk + ykipi. Since agent
k exhausts her budget, we have ykkpk + ykipi = Bk = 1. Thus there must exist ℓ ∈ {k, i} where
ykℓpℓ ≥ 1/2. Therefore xkℓpℓ ≥ 1/2.
Since akk 6= aik and aki 6= aii, we have akℓ 6= aiℓ. Because (y, p) is an IME, we have xiℓ = 1−xkℓ.
Also, since agent k spends money on issue ℓ, we have xckℓpℓ ≤ x
c
kjpj < 1/2
c by assumption. Therefore
xckℓpℓ < 1/2
c < xciℓpℓ
xckℓpℓ < (1− xkℓ)
cpℓ
xckℓ < (1− xkℓ)
c
xkℓ < (1− xkℓ)
xkℓ < 1/2
Since agent k exhausts her budget, we have ykkpk+ykipi = Bk = 1, and so xkkpk+xkipi = 1. Thus
there must exist ℓ ∈ {i, k} where ykℓpℓ ≥ 1/2. Because x
c
kℓpℓ < 1/2
c, we have x1−ckℓ /2
c > xkℓpℓ ≥
1/2. Therefore
x1−ckℓ
2c
>
1
2
(1/2)1−c
2c
>
1
2
1 > 1
which is a contradiction. Therefore for every agent i, there exists an issue j where xcijpj ≤ 1/2
c.
By assumption, if xcijpj > min
ℓ∈M
xciℓpℓ, then agent i spends no money on issue j. Since there
exists an issue j where xcijpj ≤ 1/2
c, we have that agent i spends no money on any issue j where
xcijpj > 1/2
c.
Suppose for sake of contradiction that an agent i and issue j exist where xcijpj > 1/2
c: then some
agent k where akj = aij is spending money on issue j. But since akj = aij, we have x
c
kjpk > 1/2
c,
so agent k cannot be spending any money on issue j. Therefore for every agent i and every issue
j, xcijpj ≤ 1/2
c.
Suppose for sake of contradiction that there exists an issue j where pj 6= 1. Since
∑
ℓ∈M pℓ = n,
there must exist an issue ℓ where pℓ > 1. Let k be any other agent other than ℓ: then akℓ 6= aℓℓ.
Since xkℓ + xℓℓ = 1, we have max(xkℓ, xℓℓ) ≥ 1/2. Therefore (max(xkℓ, xℓℓ))
cpℓ > 1/2
c, which is a
contradiction. Therefore pj = 1 for all j.
Finally, suppose there exists an agent i and issue j where xij 6= 1/2, there must exist an agent
k where xkj > 1/2. Then x
c
kjpj > 1/2
c, which is again a contradiction. Therefore for every agent i
and issue j, xij = 1/2.
We are now ready to prove Theorems 3.3 and 3.4.
Theorem 3.3. For any IME (y, p) of Φ(n, 1) with Cobb-Douglas utilities,
max
z
′
NW (z′)
NW (y)
≥
2− 2/n
(n− 1)1/n
35
Proof. Let xi be agent i’s public bundle as induced by y. Recall that a Cobb-Douglas utility is
given by
ui(y) = ui(xi) =
( ∏
j∈M
x
wij
ij
)1/∑j∈M wij
which for Φ(n, 1), simplifies to
ui(xi) =
( ∏
j∈M
xij
)1/n
Thus for all j, we have
1
pj
∂(ui(y))
∂xij
=
x
1
n
−1
ij
pjn
( ∏
ℓ∈M\{j}
xiℓ
)1/n
=
1
xijpjn
( ∏
ℓ∈M
xiℓ
)1/n
=
1
xijpjn
ui(xi)
We are going to invoke Lemma C.1 with c = 1. Suppose that there exists an agent i and issues j, ℓ
such that agent i is spending on issue j, but xijpj > xiℓpℓ. Then
1
pj
∂(ui(y))
∂xij
<
1
pℓ
∂(ui(y))
∂xiℓ
Thus there exists some δ > 0 such that if agent i spent δ less on issue j and δ more on issue ℓ,
agent i’s utility would increase. But xi is in agent i’s demand set, so it cannot be possible for
her to increase her utility while staying within her budget. This is a contradiction, so therefore
xijpj = minℓ∈M xiℓpℓ for all i, j.
Therefore by Lemma C.1, we have xij = 1/2 for all i and j. So the Nash welfare of y is
NW (y) =
(∏
i∈N
( ∏
j∈M
xij
)1/n)1/n
=
(∏
i∈N
( ∏
j∈M
1/2
)1/n)1/n
=
(∏
i∈N
1/2
)1/n
= 1/2
Consider the outcome z′ where x′ii(z
′) = 1/n for all i, and x′ij(z
′) =
n− 1
n
whenever j 6= i. Then
NW (z′) =
(∏
i∈N
( ∏
j∈M
x′ij
)1/n)1/n
=
(∏
i∈N
(
1
n
(
n− 1
n
)n−1)1/n)1/n
=
(
1
n
(
n− 1
n
)n−1)1/n
=
( 1
n− 1
(n− 1
n
)n)1/n
=
1
(n− 1)1/n
n− 1
n
=
1− 1/n
(n− 1)1/n
Therefore
max
z
′
NW (z′)
NW (y)
≥
2− 2/n
(n− 1)1/n
Theorem 3.4. For any IME (y, p) of Φ(n, 1) with CES utilities for parameter ρ ∈ (−∞, 0)∪(0, 1),
max
z
′
NW (z′)
NW (y)
≥ 2(1 − 1/n)1/ρ
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Proof. Let xi be agent i’s public bundle as induced by y. Recall that a CES utility is given by
ui(y) = ui(xi) =
(∑
j∈M
wρijx
ρ
ij
)1/ρ
=
(∑
j∈M
xρij
)1/ρ
and so we have
1
pj
∂(ui(y))
∂xij
=
1
pj
1
ρ
ρxρ−1ij
(∑
j∈M
xρij
) 1
ρ
−1
=
1
x1−ρij pj
ui(xi)
ρ( 1
ρ
−1)
This time, we are going to invoke Lemma C.1 with c = 1− ρ (note that since ρ ∈ (−∞, 0) ∪ (0, 1),
we have 1−ρ > 0). Suppose that there exists an agent i and issues j, ℓ such that agent i is spending
on issue j, but x1−ρij pj > x
1−ρ
iℓ pℓ. Then
1
pj
∂(ui(y))
∂xij
<
1
pℓ
∂(ui(y))
∂xiℓ
So again there exists some δ > 0 such that if agent i spent δ less on issue j and δ more on issue ℓ,
agent i’s utility would increase. But xi is in agent i’s demand set, so this is a contradiction for the
same reason as in the previous proof. Thus xijpj = minℓ∈M xiℓpℓ for all i, j.
Therefore, by Lemma C.1, we have xij = 1/2 for all i and j, so the Nash welfare of y is
NW (y) =
(∏
i∈N
(∑
j∈M
xρij
)1/ρ)1/n
=
(∏
i∈N
(∑
j∈M
(1/2)ρ
)1/ρ)1/n
=
(∏
i∈N
n1/ρ
2
)1/n
=
n1/ρ
2
Consider the outcome z′ where x′ii(z
′) = 0 for all i and x′ij(z
′) = 1 whenever j 6= i. Then
NW (z′) =
(∏
i∈N
(∑
j∈M
xρij
)1/ρ)1/n
=
(∏
i∈N
( ∑
j∈M\{i}
1
)1/ρ)1/n
=
(∏
i∈N
(n− 1)1/ρ
)1/n
= (n− 1)1/ρ
Therefore
max
z
′
NW (z′)
NW (y)
≥
(n− 1)1/ρ
n1/ρ/2
= 2
(n− 1
n
)1/ρ
= 2(1− 1/n)1/ρ
C.2 Omitted proofs from Section 5
Theorem 5.1. Consider a Fisher market taˆtonnement T . Suppose T converges to a δ-equilibrium
for H-nested leontief utilities in O(κ(m,n, δ)) time steps, where n is the number of agents and
m the number of goods. Then R←(T ) converges to a 3δ-PME for the PDM with H utilities in
O(κ(n2m,n, δ)).
Proof. By the reduction defined in Section 4, the hidden private market has O(n2m) goods (1 copy
of each good for each pair of agents who disagree on the issue) and n agents.
We next show the taˆtonnement T is being run correctly, i.e., the sequence of prices (p0, p1, p2...),
alongside some demands (yti ∈ D
R
i (p
t)) converges to a δ-equilibrium. This is not trivial since T is
run with a detour through the PDM. By Corollary B.6.1, given prices p ∼ R(Γ) and a bundle yi ∼ Γ,
yi ∈ Di(R
←(p)) ⇐⇒ R(yi) ∈ D
R
i (p). Thus at each step, p
t+1 is being calculated by gT based
on valid demands in DRi (p
t), so the sequence of prices (p0, p1, p2...) converges to a δ-equilibrium.
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Then, by supposition, there exist demands y ∼ R(Γ) at time T such that (y, pT ) ∼ R(Γ) form a
δ-equilibrium in the hidden Fisher market, for T = O(κ(n2m,n, δ)).
Recall Theorem 4.2: (y, p) is a Fisher market equilibrium if and only if (R←(y), R←(p)) is a
PME. The rest of the proof involves showing that Theorem 4.2 holds for approximate equilibria
as well, as defined. Recall that R←(yi)j = min
k∈N :
aij 6=akj
yi(ikj) ∀j ∈ M , and R
←(p)ij =
∑
k∈N :
aij 6=akj
p(ikj)
∀i ∈ N, j ∈M . We claim (R←(y), R←(pt)) forms a 3δ-PME:
1. yi ∈ D
R
i (p
t) =⇒ R←(yi) ∈ Di(R
←(pt)). (Lemma B.6)
2. We define z = (z1...zm) ∈ [0, 1]m×2 as follows, analogously to Equation (4) in the proof of
Theorem 4.223:
zj,0 = max
i∈N :aij=0
R←(yi)j
zj,1 = max(1− zj,0, 0)
Then, ∀j ∈M ,
(a) zj,0 + zj,1 ≤ 1 + δ follows from the definition and from y part of a δ-equilibrium of a
Fisher market.
(b) For all i ∈ N , R←(yi)j ≤ z
j,aij + δ follows from Equations (5)-(7), with 1 replaced with
1 + δ and the = in line (7) replaced with ≤. Finally,
R←(p)ij > nδ =⇒ ∃k˜ s.t. p(ikj) > δ
=⇒ yi(ik˜j) + yk˜(ik˜j) > 1− δ (Condition 2 of Fisher δ-equilibrium)
By Lemma B.4, p(ik˜j) > 0 =⇒ yi(ik˜j) = mink∈N :
aij 6=ak˜j
yi(ik˜j) = R
←(yi)j , and yk˜(ik˜j) = R
←(yk˜)j .
Then
R←(yi)j > 1−R
←(yk˜)j − δ
> 1− zj,ak˜j − 2δ (First part of Condition (b)
> zj,aij − 3δ definition of zj,aij)
Thus, R←(p)ij > nδ =⇒ R
←(yi)j > z
j,aij − 3δ
D General taˆtonnement with asymptotic convergence in Fisher
markets
The prior work discussed in Section 5 established deterministic taˆtonnements with polynomial
time convergence rates only for certain classes of utility functions, or for those that converge to
weak equilibria. However, we would like a general PDM converges for a wider class of utilities (in
particular, linear utilities). To achieve this, we sacrifice convergence in polynomial time (or any
characterization of convergence rates), which has been the primary focus on prior work such as
[4, 13]24. In this section, we present a discrete stochastic gradient descent style taˆtonnement for all
23In the proof of Theorem 4.2, the definition of zj,1 was simply 1− zj,0. It is necessary to use max(1− zj,0, 0) here
instead: because this is an approximate equilibrium, it is possible that zj,0 > 1, which would make 1− zj,0 negative.
24Those works take great care to show conditions analogous to strong convexity or Lipschitz continuity of the
gradient in the cases of interest.
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Fisher markets that result from PDMs with EG utility functions through the reduction. This can
then be lifted through Theorem 5.1 to yield a general PDM taˆtonnement.
This section broadly follows the gradient descent framework for Fisher market taˆtonnements
from [13], and the taˆtonnement can be seen as an asymptotic discretization of their continuous
time taˆtonnement. The taˆtonnement operates on the dual of the EG convex program, which is a
function of the prices, and whose gradient is the excess demand (Lemma D.1). We first establish
that there exists a bounded, convex region Π in which demands are bounded, with p∗ ∈ Π25. We
finish the proof with a standard SGD convergence technique, Lemma D.3.
Let φ(p) be the objective of the dual of EG convex program. We use DR to denote demands as
the demands are in a Fisher market R(Γ) that is constructed from PDM Γ. The following lemma
from [13] establishes that φ(p) is itself a convex function whose gradient is the excess demand.
Lemma D.1 ([13]). ∇φ(p) = 1−
∑
iD
R
i (pi)
Note that φ(p) refers to the set of sub-gradients, and DRi (pi) to the set of demands. Even
when demands at a given price are not unique (such as with linear utilities), each combination of
demands yields a sub-gradient of the dual objective function.
Before being able to apply a canonical gradient descent convergence theorem, we need to estab-
lish that there exists a bounded, convex set which contains the optimal price p∗ in its interior. We
construct such a set next.
Lemma D.2. ∃Π ⊂ Rm+ bounded and convex s.t. p
∗ ∈ argmaxφ(p) ⊂ Π, and that ∀p ∈ Π,∀i,
DRi (p) <∞.
Proof. We claim p∗ ∈ [0, 2]m in our setting. Let yi ∈ D
R
i (p
∗
i ), and thus p
∗
jyij ≤ Bi = 1∀j. By
Fisher market equilibrium conditions, p∗j > 0 =⇒
∑
i yij = 1. In our setting, yij > 0 for at most
two distinct i. Thus, ∃i s.t. yij ≥
1
2 =⇒ p
∗
j ≤ 2.
Let pmin be any value such that 0 < pmin < min{j:p∗j>0} p
∗
j . Then, let Π = [p
1
min, 2]×· · ·×[p
m
min, 2],
where pjmin =
{
0 p∗j = 0
pmin else
. Π as defined has the desired properties.
Throughout, we use [·]X denote the projection onto a set X . We will also use the following
stochastic gradient descent convergence lemma.
Lemma D.3 ([35]). Consider a convex function f on a non-empty bounded closed convex set
X ⊂ Rm, and use [·]X to designate the projection operator. Starting with some x0 ∈ X , consider
the SGD update rule xt = [xt−1 − ηt(∇f(xt) + zt + et)]X , where zt is a zero-mean random variable
and et is a constant. Let Et[·] be the conditional expectation given Ft, the σ-field generated by
x0, x1, . . . , xt. If
f(·) has a unique minimizer x∗ ∈ X
ηt > 0,
∑
t
ηt =∞,
∑
t
η2t <∞
∃C1 ∈ R <∞ s.t. ‖∇f(x)‖2 ≤ C1,∀x ∈ X
∃C2 ∈ R <∞ s.t. Et[‖zt‖
2] ≤ C2,∀ t
∃C3 ∈ R <∞ s.t. ‖et‖2 ≤ C3,∀ t∑
t
ηt‖et‖ <∞ w.p. 1
25It is well known that the primal objective function is strictly concave, and so p∗, the optimal dual solution, is
unique.
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Then xt → x
∗ w.p. 1 as t→∞.
We can now construct a stochastic taˆtonnement for a Fisher Market R(Γ) that is constructed
from PDM Γ when agents have any EG utility function in the PDM, as H-nested leontief utility
functions remain EG utility functions.
Lemma D.4. Suppose p∗ ∈ argminφ(p). Then, ∃y = (y1 . . . yn) s.t. yi ∈ D
R
i (p
∗), (y, p∗) is a ME.
Proof. Follows directly from Part 2 of Lemma 5 in [13], that argmaxx≥0 L(x, p) ⊆ D
R(p). The ME
(x∗, p∗) is such that x∗ ∈ argmaxx≥0 L(x, p
∗) ⊆ DR(p∗).
Theorem D.5. Let agents i in the PDM Γ have utilities ui ∈ H that are concave, continuous, non-
decreasing, non-constant, and homogeneous of degree 1. Then there exists a stochastic gradient
descent-style taˆtonnement for which, as t → ∞, pt → p∗, where p∗ ∈ argminφ(p), and ∃x s.t.
xi ∈ Di(p
∗) and (x,R←(p∗)) is a PME.
Proof. Construct a Fisher market R(Γ) through the reduction.
Let T be the following descent in the constructed market. Start with prices p0 ∈ Π, where Π as
defined in Lemma D.2. Update prices using the rule pt+1 = [pt− ηt
(
1−
∑
i D˜
R
i (p
t
i)
)
]Π, for ηt =
1
t ,
and D˜Ri (p) = yi,t+ bi,t+ zi,t, for some yi,t ∈ D
R
i (p
t). Assume zi,t a zero-mean random variable and
bi,t a constant that follow the conditions of Lemma D.3.
By Lemma 4.1, the implied utility functions still yield Eisenberg-Gale markets and by Lemma D.1,
∇φ(p) = 1−
∑
iD
R
i (p). By Lemma D.2, ∃C <∞ s.t. ‖∇φ(p)‖ < C,∀p ∈ Π. Convergence to prices
p∗ ∈ argminφ(p) follows from Lemma D.3. By Lemma D.4, ∃y, yi ∈ D
R
i (p
∗) s.t. (y, p∗) is a ME
in the Fisher market. Thus, T converges asymptotically to a ME.
By Theorem 5.1, T can be lifted to create a taˆtonnement R←(T ) in the PDM that converges
asymptotically to a PME.
Note that Π is not known a priori. However, it can be approximated during the gradient descent
without affecting convergence: for example, if at any point demand goes to infinity, backtrack and
impose a minimum price. Then, if demand goes to 0 with a positive price, lower this minimum
price.
Theorem D.5 and Theorem 5.1 together create a taˆtonnement with asymptotic convergence
for Public Decision Markets for general concave, continuous, non-constant, non-decreasing, and
homogeneous of degree 1 utility functions.
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